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ABSTRACT

IMPACTS OF POLITICIZATION AND CONFLICT ON ARCHAEOLOGICAL
RESOURCES: AN ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN IRAQ
by
Andrew Vang-Roberts

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2021
Under the Supervision of Professor Bettina Arnold
Archeological resources have been used by political regimes to further their own interests since
the discipline was established in the late 19th century. Regime-backed 20th century dictators in
Iraq, Iran and Egypt understood that whoever controls a nation’s archeological resources controls
its memory and its people. However, power changes hands and archeological resources are not
immune to the shifting of power, be it through external conflict such as an invasion or internal
conflict such as a revolution. In situations where the ruling party is overthrown and a power
vacuum forms, destructive activities such as looting and land development increase and it is
often a struggle to get the new governments to recognize archeological resources as having
value. This thesis explores how archeological resources were affected when power changed
hands in Iraq under the Ba’athist regime led by Saddam Hussein and after his removal. The focus
will be on how different political, societal, and academic forces interacted with archaeological
resources in Iraq after the 2003 invasion and the rise of ISIS/ISIL. Identifying the patterns and
preconditions that characterize such transitions can help to mitigate negative impacts under
similar circumstances elsewhere in the future.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Archaeological resources have been used by political regimes to further their own
interests across time and space for many decades ever since the discipline was established as a
profession in the late 19th century. Regime-backed 20th century dictators like Iraq’s President
Saddam Hussein (1937-2006), Iran’s Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989), and
Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak (1928-2020) understood that whoever controls a nation’s
archaeological resources controls the nation’s memory. By controlling collective memory, a
regime can assert control over its people. Archaeological resources can be used to validate a
regime’s control over physical space as well, as has been demonstrated in many different
contexts (Arnold 2006; Sommer 2017; Feige 2008; Gänger 2009; Trigger 1984; Meskell 2020).
Educating a population about its archaeological past can help solidify the legitimacy of a
political entity. This is well-illustrated by the examples of Iraq (De Cesari 2015), Iran (Abdi
2001), China (Friedman 1994) and Egypt (Silberman 1989). However, power changes hands and
archaeological resources are not immune to the shifting of power, be it through external conflict
such as an invasion or internal conflict such as a revolution. While destruction of sites by
military action is an obvious source of threat, as when overly zealous soldiers fire weapons into
or bomb cultural sites intentionally (Arnold 2014), archaeological resources are also impacted by
changing political agendas. For example, textbooks printed after the Iranian revolution all but
omitted references to pre-Islamic history due to the political motives of the revolutionary
government, rejecting the deposed government’s affinity for pre-Islamic archaeology. In
addition, the Department of Archaeology was closed in 1979 and didn’t resume activities fully
until 1990 (Abdi 2001). In situations where the ruling party is overthrown and a power vacuum
forms, destructive activities such as looting and land development are expanded (Parcak 2015;
1

Ikram 2013; Kane 2015). For example, during China’s sociopolitical movement known as the
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the education system created a narrative of the rise of Chinese
civilization that ignored the multicultural and ethnically diverse nature of ancient China
(Friedman 1994). This led to a misrepresented history designed to legitimize the policies of the
contemporary ruling parties. After power changes hands it is often a struggle to get the new
governments to recognize archaeological resources as having value (Kane 2015).
This thesis seeks to examine how archaeological resources are affected when power
changes hands by examining the politicization of archaeological resources by the Ba’athist
regime under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, and how these resources were affected by
regime changes in Iraq. The focus will be on how the nation’s archaeological resources were
affected, including the impact on the region’s people, a direct result of the role archaeological
resources play in identity creation. How different political, societal, and academic forces
interacted with archaeological resources in Iraq after the 2003 invasion and how they were
affected by the rise of ISIS/ISIL will also be investigated. Identifying the patterns and
preconditions that characterize such transitions can help to mitigate negative impacts under
similar circumstances elsewhere in the future. A brief history of Iraq and archaeological
investigations in the region will be discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 will examine how political
entities impacted archaeological resources in Iraq and how those resources were coopted by
these entities. Chapter 4 will examine how Iraq’s people interacted with archaeological resources
through the lens the nation’s political regime afforded them, and how, after that regime
collapsed, these resources were viewed differently. Chapter 5 will discuss what can be done in
the future to minimize damage to archaeological resources during the destabilization of political
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regimes and how these resources are a valuable tool for intelligence gathering as well as gaining
the trust of local populations.
Iraq Case Study
Iraq demonstrates how archaeological resources and their interpretation can be impacted
by a political regime before, during, and after military invasion (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Map of Iraq (http://ian.macky.net/pat/map/iq/iq_blu.gif).
Iraq’s Baathist party under Saddam Hussein emphasized the region’s archaeology to
legitimize itself as a government for all Iraqis, although human rights abuses were pervasive.
Even though Iraq has more than 6000 years of archaeological heritage, the party chose to
emphasize Mesopotamian civilization over other historical periods. This may have been because
Iraq’s former colonizers placed so much emphasis on it in their research, including early
archaeologists such as Layard (1854), Rich (1818), and Koldewey (1914), which established a
cultural precedent within Iraq to gravitate toward this temporal and cultural context. This is the
3

exact opposite of what happened in Iran during the same period, when the emphasis was placed
on Islamic archaeology and non-western influenced topics (Abdi 2001). During the reign of
Saddam Hussein, the archaeology of Iraq was fused to his nationalist view of a powerful Iraq
loosely modeled on ancient Babylon (De Cesari 2015). Although many different groups have
inhabited the region, the Babylonian civilization is by far the most famous, and due to its
prestige, the archaeological evidence from this cultural context was ripe for political
manipulation. The Baathist government funded numerous excavations and restorations of various
ziggurats and sites identified as Babylonian, or within the Babylonian sphere of influence.
Because of governmental protections and education on the value of archaeological resources
there was virtually no looting of archaeological sites in Iraq prior to the fall of Saddam Hussein
and the Baathist party (Gibson 2003). After the government became completely destabilized and
Saddam went into hiding, archaeological sites in Iraq lost their protection by the Iraqi military
from looting and collecting (Gibson 2003). Iraqi archaeology has gone through many phases
since the 2003 invasion and is currently still in a state of flux (Figure 1.2). Archaeological
resources in Iraq have been impacted by large scale looting, political corruption, and lack of
institutional protection (Poole 2008; Bogdanos 2005; Adams 2001). The Baghdad Museum lost
over 15,000 artifacts to looting (Bogdanos 2005); the identity of these looters is still murkily
veiled by the fog of war and was not limited to the Baghdad Museum. This represents a change
from the limited looting of pre-invasion Iraq and illustrates the shift in how archaeological
resources were valued by the population until survival in times of unrest began to overrule
personal beliefs or principles. Some sites escaped looting only to become neglected and have
fallen into disrepair, as reflected in a joint Iraqi-British survey conducted in 2008 (Curtis et al.
2008). This suggests that certain regions or sites have been better managed, that locals have
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found ways to sustainably profit from the sites, or that the populations that interact with theses
site are not interested in looting from them. Iraq offers insights into how archaeological
resources are affected by an extended period of armed conflict in a nation with a formerly strong
dictatorship.

Figure 1.2. Timeline of Iraqi political and military events since 1968.

Literature Review

History of Iraq and Political Regimes
Understanding the different phases of Iraqi history is crucial for anyone trying to study
the region. Although there are many periods in Iraqi history that could be studied, this thesis
focuses on those that were most relevant to the state under Saddam Hussein. Studies of the
archaeological investigations conducted in Iraq during the late 19th century (Kramer 1963; Lloyd
1980; Pedde 2015) provide a general background on the type of archaeological excavations
conducted in the region and the types of artifacts found at sites deemed of special cultural value.
When examining these excavations, it is also important to understand the impact of the
decipherment of cuneiform on the salience of archaeological resources for purposes of nation5

building (Sayce 2019; Cathcart 2011). Cuneiform’s decipherment influenced some aspects of
Iraqi art and culture under the Ba’athist regime in the 20th century in significant ways. Important
figures in Iraqi archaeology such as Gertrude Bell (Wallach 1996), Hormuzd Rassam (Reade
1993) and Leonard Woolley (Winstone 1990) contributed to understanding how powers outside
Iraq influenced the nation. Along with the biographies of the individuals who contributed to
early Iraqi archaeology it is important to consider the history of the colonial Middle East, the
creation of the nation-state that is Iraq today (Fisk 2005; Meskell 2020; Lieshout 2016) and how
this has impacted the peoples of Iraq (Hourani 1991; Tripp 2007; Vinogradov 1972). Because a
great deal of this thesis focuses on the ways that Saddam Hussein interacted with and coopted
archaeological resources, his personal and professional history are important for understanding
how the past shaped the ways Iraq and its people have interacted with its archaeological record
(Bengio 1998; Coughlin 2005; Niblock 1982). Primary sources such as the program for the 1989
International Babylon Festival (Iraq’s Ministry of Culture 1989) and contemporary news
bulletins from Saudi Aramco (Tracy 1989) also help reveal the people’s connection with the
archaeological past in Iraq.
Politicization of Archaeology and Links to Nationalism
A great deal has been written about the politicization of archaeology and how nationalist
elements have interacted with and coopted archaeological resources (Trigger 1984; Sommer
2017; Kohl and Fawcett 1995). Trigger and Sommer both provide a general overview of this
subject, but to really understand the politicization of archaeology one must look at case studies
such as how the Third Reich coopted archaeological and anthropological research in Germany
(Arnold 2006, 2014), how resources can be used to shore up nationalist entities (Gänger 2009),
and how resources can be used to forge false narratives (Friedman 1994). Much has been written
6

about the Nazi cooption of archaeology and how archaeology was treated in the Cultural
Revolution in China to a lesser extent, but much less has been written on how archaeology was
politicized in the Middle East, specifically in countries that were considered hostile to Western
powers during the Cold War. Archaeological resources under these regimes have had to weather
various shifts of power, as illustrated by the situation in Iran (Abdi 2001), governmental cooption
and repression in Israel and Egypt (Feige 2015; Parcak 2015) and Iraq itself (Silberman 1989; De
Cesari 2015). This collective body of work is crucial to an examination of the events that
transpired between the rise of the Ba’athist party in Iraq and the rise of the Islamic state with its
destabilizing effect on the Middle East as a whole.
Destabilization of Iraq and Damage to Iraq’s Archaeological Resources
The topic of destabilization of regimes and the damage done to archaeological resources
in the resulting chaotic conditions is interesting to study due to the eclectic nature of the
resources available. Journals and academic studies have highlighted the topic of damage and
looting (Lawler 2008; Adams 2001; Bogdanos 2005; Gibson 2003; Kopanias et al. 2015; Kane
2015; Ikram 2013), the use of military forces to protect sites (Deblauwe 2004), and a massive
study conducted by the British Ministry of Defense in 2008 that focused on the damages done by
both military forces and looters in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion (Curtis et al. 2008).
However, a substantial amount of the information on the topic comes from media outlets and was
produced for public consumption (Jackson 2007; Rathje 2001; Borger 2004; Glancey 2004;
Poole 2008). This public format has also led to a number of publications on side topics dealing
with the personality cult of Saddam Hussein (Cremonesi 2003; Stansfield and Anderson 2004).
Post-Iraq War publications, especially those after the rise of ISIS/ISIL, focus on international
terror (Arab 2019; Laessing 2017) and looting (Brodie 2011). It is interesting that non7

archaeology focused sources such as the journal of Intelligence and National Security (Pfiffner
2010), architectural journals (Kulić 2015), and international affairs studies (Miller 2020) also
have highlighted this topic. Official training resources created by the US government
(CENTCOM 2006), propaganda created by ISIS/ISIL and even photo sharing social media
(Amin 2019) have contributed to the body of knowledge on this topic as well.
Anecdotal Information as Supporting Evidence
This thesis also makes use of anecdotal information provided by individuals who lived
during Saddam Hussein’s reign, grew up during the 2003 Invasion, fled Iraq after the rise of
ISIS/ISIL, and saw firsthand the inner workings of the illicit antiquities market in Iraq. Many of
these individuals cannot be named due to the potential of repercussions befalling them for
speaking out on this subject. Along with social pressure brought to bear on Iraqi citizens to not
speak of the Saddam Hussein regime, there is also cultural pressure, and in some cases
institutional pressure, preventing these individuals from ever publishing or presenting this
information in a formal setting. I have worked with many of these individuals for years and
consider these voices to be equally valuable as those who publish on the topic in academic
journals. Anecdotal information provided by these individuals over the years was compared to
the published evidence highlighted in the literature review and information gathered from all
sources was treated with extreme care to preserve anonymity.
Research Questions
The guiding research questions of this thesis were as follows: “How has Iraq, a nation
that has historically promoted archaeology as a national resource, handled archaeological sites
and artifacts in the aftermath of military conflict and civil unrest that destabilized the national
regime? Do the interactions between governments and communities with archaeological
8

resources under their care illustrated by this case study provide a way to predict or develop
strategies to deal with such events under particular conditions?”
Considerations:
1. How were/are archaeological resources treated by successive governments in Iraq? Were they
seen as valuable resources, burdens, or ignored?
2. What relationship do these resources have to the nation’s cultural identity and tourism
industry?
3. How were/are archaeological remains treated by private citizens pre- and post- regime
change? Were/are they respected and protected, looted, or used as an economic draw or resource
to be exploited?
4. Based on this case study, what conclusions can we draw from contemporary conflicts to
develop a toolkit/protocol for dealing with and protecting archaeological resources in future
conflicts?
Methodology and Variables
The research questions were addressed by means of a qualitative synthetic analysis of the
political systems, archaeological resources and shifting attitudes toward the material remains of
the past represented by the case study. This research was conducted at the intersection of history,
archaeology, and political science and a qualitative analysis is best suited to a synthetic approach
such as the one applied here. Qualitative data were gathered through analysis of published peer
reviewed material, maps, satellite and other visual images, as well as anecdotal information
gleaned by the researcher in the course of his interactions with individuals on the ground through
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military service and volunteer activities between 2013 and 2019. The project’s guiding questions
provided a lens through which to interpret the published material. The data were tested against
the project’s research questions to investigate how archaeological resources were and are treated
in the region included in the analysis.
Anecdotal Information and Identification of Informants
This thesis makes use of anecdotal information gleaned from casual conversations
conducted prior to the research conducted for this project. The information presented in this
thesis is derived from personal experience. Individuals involved in these conversations were
labeled as CI (Confidential Informants). As no formal interviews were conducted, an IRB was
not necessary. No informants associated with the US Military or in Iraq are identified by name,
including current and former US military and current or former Iraqi citizens. All other
identifying information was changed as well to protect their privacy as well as prevent any harm
from befalling them as a result of their contact with the researcher. Academic and news sources
in the public domain were used to corroborate the anecdotal information provided by informants.
The academic treatment of this topic was filtered through the researcher’s personal experiences
working with Iraqi civilians and the US military.
Variables Evaluated:
1) The attitudes of Iraqi citizens toward archaeology and archaeological resources. This was
measured by analyzing how individuals describe their personal relationships with archaeology,
and how this relationship changed over the course of the shifts of power experienced over
several decades, including how sites are being used by the local population.
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2) The national government’s attitudes toward archaeological resources and the study of
archaeology. This was measured by looking at how the different political factions have interacted
with archaeology and how these interactions changed or stayed the same before, during, and after
the transition of power. How these governments interacted and continue to interact with
professional archaeologists, both foreign and domestic, and academia more generally also
contribute to this discussion.

Data Sources

1) Newspaper reports on archaeological discoveries (frequency and changes over time) in the
national press (mainly online).

2) Anecdotal evidence from local informants gathered on the ground from 2013 to 2016.

3) Secondary sources that provide data on changes in looting frequency and intensity using
proxies like aerial photographs of sites and changes in the number of artifacts from the countries
included in the case studies appearing in western and Asian auction catalogs.

4) Secondary sources that provide data on the growth and development of terror groups in the
region and how this compares with both the destruction of archaeological resources and the
illegal artifact trade.

Limitations
The main limitation of this investigation was the availability of published source
material. On the military side, some of the most useful sources are still classified and there is
limited access to human subjects. Availability of information is especially problematic in Iraq,
11

which is still an active warzone in which information can be scattered or is simply not available
to the public. There is a smaller sample of academic work to review. This is a relatively new
topic, so few scholars have addressed how contemporary conflicts are actively influencing
archaeology in the region. Finding individuals willing or able to share their opinions and
experiences in these regions is also limited due to geography and the fact that speaking about
these issues could target some individuals and potentially lead to personal harm. I have
established friendships with a large number of Iraqi refugees and civilians via my previous work
with the Iraqi American Reconciliation Project, the Minnesota Literacy Council, and my military
service, and was able to access some of the relevant information through these sources. Another
limitation when working with human subjects is the possibility for these subjects to alter the
narrative when being interviewed (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). In spite of these limitations,
it was possible to gather enough data from primary and secondary sources to produce an
effective analysis of the uses and abuses of archaeological data for gain, both economic and
political, in these regions.
Significance of Study
Archaeological research focuses on the past by definition, so it has a tendency to lean
toward quantitative, data driven analysis. While quantitative research is incredibly valuable, it
often overlooks how the past influences the present. This study uses a synthetic qualitative
approach to help us understand the intersection between people and archaeology. By presenting
archaeological resources as actively stimulating action by participants in the present, we can
illustrate how archaeological resources interact with and influence political power networks at
the local and national level alike.
Implications for Future Research
12

The approach developed here could be applied to post WWII conflicts in South East Asia
as well as Latin America and the Caribbean, where archaeological resources have also been
affected by various Cold War upheavals. The general significance of this thesis lies in its ability
to illuminate how manipulation of the past in the present is an obvious and recurrent concern in
contemporary societies. This study will contribute to an ongoing effort to expose and reveal just
how pernicious this symbiotic relationship can be.
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Chapter 2: Brief Historical Outlines of the Case Study Regions
Brief Modern History of Iraq
Iraq is a western Asian country, bordered to the north by Turkey, to the east by Iran, to
the south by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and to the west by Jordan and Syria (Figure 1.1). Iraq has
a limited amount of coastline on the northern Persian Gulf connected to the Mesopotamian
Alluvial Plain. Two major rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, run south through the center of Iraq
and into the Shatt al-Arab near the Persian Gulf. These two rivers provide Iraq with substantial
amounts of fertile land in the south. The Zagros Mountains run along the eastern border of the
country with Iran, while the western portion of the country is part of the eastern Syrian Desert
(Figure 2.2). Iraq’s central location on the Asian continent and its geography have made it a
cultural melting pot for millennia.
Iraq is and historically has been home to diverse ethnic groups including Arabs, Kurds,
Assyrians, Turkmen, Shabakis, Yazidis, Armenians, Mandaeans, Circassians, Sabians and
Kawliya (CIA 2020). Today, around 99% of the country's 38 million citizens are Muslims, with
small minority populations of Christians, Yarsans, Yezidis and Mandeans also present (CIA
2020). The official languages of Iraq are Arabic and Kurdish.
The region between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which is historically known as
Mesopotamia, is often referred to as the Cradle of Civilization (Figure 2.1). This region is one of
the locations where modern humans first began to domesticate plants and animals, develop
writing, create laws and live in cities under an organized government—notably the city-state of
Uruk, from which, it has been speculated, the name "Iraq" is derived. The area has been home to
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Figure 2.1. Map of Mesopotamia (http://mrscelis6.weebly.com/mesopotamia.html)
successive civilizations since the 6th millennium BC, making Iraq one of the most traversed and
contested regions on the planet. Historically Iraq was the center of the Akkadian, Sumerian,
Assyrian and Babylonian Empires. It was also at different times part of the Median,
Achaemenid, Hellenistic, Parthian, Sassanid, Roman, Rashidun, Umayyad, Abbasid, Ayyubid,
Seljuk, Mongol, Timurid, Safavid, Afsharid, and Ottoman Empires (Fagan and Scarre 2008;
Hourani 1991) (Figure 2.1).
The Ottoman Empire controlled what is now Iraq until its partition on October 30, 1918
(Hourani 1991). Under the Ottomans, the country was divided into three provinces, called
Vilâyets in the Ottoman Turkish language: Mosul Vilâyet, Baghdad Vilâyet, and Basra Vilâyet,
which still correspond to the main modern population centers of Iraq today. During the First
World War, the Ottoman Empire sided with Germany and the Central Powers. During the
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Mesopotamian campaign against the Central Powers, British expeditionary forces invaded Iraq
and suffered a major defeat by the Turkish army during the Siege of Kut. However, subsequent
to this the British began to gain the upper hand and were substantially aided by the support of
local Arabs and Assyrians during what would be known as the Arab Revolt. In 1916, the British
and French co-authored a plan for the post-war division of western Asian countries under the
Sykes-Picot Agreement (Hourani 1991). British forces captured Baghdad in 1917 and defeated
the Ottoman garrison forces. An armistice was signed in 1918 (Hourani 1991)
After the Peace Treaty of Versailles in 1919 at the end of the First World War, the idea
put forward by the League of Nations was to create mandates for the territories that had been
occupied by the defeated Central Powers (Hourani 1991). The proposal was that the former
Central Powers territories should eventually become independent, albeit under the strict control
and supervision of one of the victorious entente countries (Lieshout 2016). People in the former
Ottoman controlled provinces began to fear the mandate concept as it suggested European
imperial rule by another name (Hourani 1991; Lieshout 2016). At the San Remo Conference in
April 1920, Britain was given the mandate for Mesopotamia (Iraq) and the mandate for Palestine
(Israel, Palestine, and Jordan). In Iraq, the British deposed most of the former Imperial Ottoman
officials and created a new administration with mainly British officials. This resulted in
favoritism toward British economic and academic interests in Iraq. Many Iraqis were concerned
that Iraq would be incorporated into the British Empire, effectively trading one imperial ruler for
another. One of the most eminent critics of British rule was the Shia mujtahid (Authority on
Islamic law), Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi al-Shirazi, who then issued a fatwa (religious ruling)
declaring that service in the British administration was unlawful (Tripp 2007).
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There was growing resentment among the Iraqi public regarding British policies such as
land ownership laws that ignored traditional tribal territories and especially the new tax law that
required people to pay for burial in the Wadi-us-Salaam Cemetery in Najaf, a sacred cemetery to
the Shia, where Shia from across the Arab world came to be buried (Vinogradov 1972). The Shia
ulema (Islamic scholars) met with tribal leaders and discussed strategies for peaceful
demonstrations but they considered violent action as an appropriate strategy if demonstrations
failed to get results. Between 1918 and 1919, three powerful anti-colonial secret societies had
been formed in Iraq. The League of the Islamic Awakening (al-Jam'iyya an-naḥda al-islāmiyya)
was established in Najaf. The Muslim National League (al-Jam'iyya al-waṭaniyya al-islāmiyya)
was created with the intention of organizing and mobilizing the Iraqi peoples for major unarmed
and armed resistance. Finally, the Guardians of Independence (Harās al-istiqlāl) was formed in
Baghdad in February 1919, a group made up of a mixture of Shia merchants, Sunni teachers,
various civil servants, Iraqi military officers, and both Sunni and Shia ulama (Ghareeb 2004).
The last of these groups was the most representative of the ethnic and cultural diversity of Iraq,
establishing cells in Karbala, Najaf, Kut, and Hillah, making it the most geographically
influential group as well. The Guardians of Independence laid down the foundations of Iraqi
nationalism that would shape the country over the next century. Under the auspices of the
Guardians of Independence the Grand Mujtahid of Karbala, Imam Shirazi, and his son, Mirza
Muhammad Riza, began to organize a counter-colonial insurgent effort (Ghareeb 2004).
Imam Shirazi issued a fatwa decreeing that it was against Islamic law for Muslims to
submit to being ruled by non-Muslims, and he called for a jihad (struggle against the enemies of
Islam) against the British. In July 1920, Mosul rebelled against British rule, and support for the
insurrection moved south down the Euphrates River valley toward the Persian Gulf. The
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insurrection was especially popular among southern tribes, who had lost their centuries old
political autonomy to the British and needed little encouragement to join the fight. The
movement however was not a unified or well-organized effort against the British and had only
limited success. The country was in a state of rebellion and anarchy for three months until the
British received military reinforcements from India and restored order. Although the revolution
was put down it demonstrated that both Sunni and Shia, urban Iraqis and nomads, and the tribes
in the southern river lands, could be brought together for a common cause. The Iraqi revolt
against the British in 1920 ignited a fire in the general population that began the long process of
creating a unified nation out of a highly diverse group of people. The revolt caused British
officials to drastically reconsider their strategy in Iraq, costing the British government 40 million
pounds, twice the amount of the annual budget allotted for Iraq (Glancey 2003). The Colonial
Secretary, Winston Churchill, recognizing that a new administration was needed in Iraq and
other British colonies in the Middle East, called for a major conference in Cairo in March 1921.
The British decided at the conference to control Iraq through indirect means, by installing former
Iraqi officials who were friendly to the British government. This would allow the British to retain
their economic interests in the region, such as oil, and their academic interests in the region,
which were primarily archaeological (Bell 1920). The British government decided to install
Faisal ibn Husayn as a puppet King of Iraq. During the Arab Revolt, Faisal had partnered with
the British military and led guerrilla operations in the region during the First World War,
enjoying strong relations with certain important British officials. British officials also thought
installing Faisal as king would prevent him from bringing his experience in guerrilla warfare to
Syria, which would motivate anti-colonial movements there and damage British-French relations
(Lieshout 2016).
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Under Faisal and his British controlled government Iraq’s social structure changed, with
the newly emergent class of Sunni and Shia landowning tribal sheikhs competing with wealthy
and prestigious urban-based Sunni families and Ottoman-trained army officers and bureaucrats
for political power. Because Iraq's newly established political institutions were the creation of a
foreign power, and because the concept of western democratic government had no precedent in
Iraqi history, the politicians in Baghdad lacked legitimacy in the Iraqi people’s eyes and never
developed deeply rooted constituencies. Although Iraq had a constitution and an elected
assembly, Iraqi politics was based on shifting alliances of important personalities and cliques
rather than what would be considered a true democracy in the west. The absence of strong
political institutions inhibited the early nationalist movement's ability to make deep inroads into
Iraq's diverse social structure. This did however create an environment where counter-colonial
ideas and revolutionary movements could take root.
On October 3, 1932 in accordance with an agreement signed by the United Kingdom in
1930, the Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq was granted independence from the UK under the rule of
King Faisal I (Vinogradov 1972). While this did end Iraq’s state of being a puppet government,
the British retained several military bases in the country, along with oil ventures and
archaeological excavations. Even on the eve of independence, Iraq and the United Kingdom had
a tense relationship, especially regarding control over the nation of Kuwait. Kuwait had loosely
been under the authority of the Ottoman vilâyet of Basra for centuries until the British severed it
from the Ottoman Empire after the First World War and on this basis the Iraqi government
considered Kuwait to be a British imperialist invention.
Upon gaining independence in 1932, political tensions arose over the continued British
presence in Iraq. Iraq's government was split between politicians who were considered pro19

British, such as Nuri as-Said, who did not oppose a continued British presence, and anti-British
nationalist politicians, such as Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, who demanded that remaining British
influence in the country be removed (Ghareeb 2004). Pressure from Arab nationalists in Iraq and
abroad led Iraqi nationalists to demand that the British leave Iraq, but these efforts remained
unsuccessful.
In the absence of a unifying government many ethnic and religious factions tried to gain
political power out of self-preservation during the 1930s. This resulted in numerous violent
revolts and brutal suppression by the Iraqi military led by Bakr Sidqi (Stansfield and Anderson
2004). In 1933, thousands of Assyrians were killed in the Simele massacre, in 1935–1936 a
series of Shia uprisings were brutally suppressed in the Euphrates region of Iraq, and in parallel
an anti-conscription Kurdish uprising in the north and a Yazidi revolt in Jabal Sinjar were
crushed in 1935 (Stansfield and Anderson 2004). Although the Hashemite monarchy may have
understood the extreme diversity of Iraq, they were compelled to try to rule the nation as a single
homogenous group while still upholding British power in the region. This further fueled both
pan-Arab unity and nationalist movements in Iraq and led to an exchange of numerous
governments. Bakr Sidqi himself ascended to power in 1936, following a successful coup d'état.
The 1941 Iraqi coup d'état overthrew Nuri as-Said and installed Rashid Ali al-Gaylani as
prime minister of a pro-Nazi government. Ali did not overthrow the monarchy, but appointed a
more compliant Regent, emphasized Iraqi independence, and attempted to restrict the rights of
the British under the 1930 treaty, including limiting British access to archaeological resources.
Rashid understood that the British had to be removed to validate the Baghdad government as
capable of leading Iraq and asked Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan for military
assistance if they would leave Iraq alone after the British were defeated. In exchange the Axis
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powers were permitted to use Iraqi bases as outposts for potential conflicts in Palestine, Iraq oil
could be purchased, and Germany was specifically granted access to Iraq’s archaeological
treasures. This information comes from oral accounts obtained from now-deceased former
Baathist officers. Documentary evidence on the Axis side of this part of the war is hard to come
by probably because files were destroyed. Some clues remain, such as the Führer Directive 30,
which defined military support for Iraq and instructed the German foreign office to work with
the Golden Square Insurgents; Fritz Gobba was the German ambassador to Iraq at the time.
There are also a few pictures of destroyed Luftwaffe aircraft (4. Staffel, II. Gruppe, KG 4) in
Iraq, and there was definitely a military campaign conducted in Iraq. It would be worth finding
someone with stronger German language skills willing to do a bit of digging into the archives in
Germany, including those of the DAI (the German Archaeological Institute) for more detail
about this interesting but poorly documented period of Iraqi archaeology. All of this
maneuvering led to the Anglo-Iraq War, which lasted from May 2 to May 31, 1941. The British
relied on expeditionary forces that understood how to play the different cultural factions of the
nation against each other to eliminate the pro-Axis Iraqi government. Ultimately the British
would reestablish themselves as an occupying force in Iraq.
After the Anglo-Iraqi War ended, Nuri as-Said was reestablished as Prime Minister and
dominated the politics of Iraq until the overthrow of the monarchy and his assassination in 1958
(Tripp 2007). Nuri as-Said pursued a largely pro-Western governmental policy during this period
with strong ties the United Kingdom. On 14 July 1958, a group that identified as the Free
Officers, a secret military group led by Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim, overthrew the Hashemite
monarchy (Figure 2.2). This group was deeply indoctrinated by Pan-Arab teachings and
nationalist sentiment (Hourani 1991). King Faisal II, Prince Abd al-Ilah, and Nuri al-Said were
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all killed. However, resentment toward Qasim for not going far enough erupted among
nationalist forces within the army and culminated in the 1959 Mosul Uprising. This attempted
coup was launched with support from Ba’athist politicians in the United Arab Republic, which
included Syria and Egypt. Ba’athisim is a political ideology centered around the concept of
national and cultural rebirth (Bengio 1998).

Figure 2.2. Timeline of Iraqi Political Events between 1958 and 2003.
In the Middle East Ba’athist movements have been characterized by a renaissance-like
cultural and intellectual growth. Ba’athism is often used as a vanguard for stronger socialist
movements to take root, blending socialist policies common in the Cold War, such as state
control of resources, while still emphasizing private property ownership (Bengio 1998; Hourani
1991). Ba’athist movements sprang up across the Arab world during the 1940s and 1950s.
Despite having strong support from local Arab tribes, the Mosul-centered leadership of the coup
was defeated in a number of days by loyalist forces within the Iraqi Army who were supported
by the Iraqi Communist Party and local Kurdish tribal militia. Following the failed coup, Mosul
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was the scene of unprecedented violence as all political and ethnic groups engaged in scoresettling, using the post-coup chaos as a cover, resulting in thousands of deaths.
This internal chaos was set against the backdrop of the Cold War and although Qasim
was politically independent, his use of the Iraqi Communist Party to help put down the rebellion
threatened anti-communist factions within the country. The communists’ growing strength
within Iraq convinced the Nationalist Iraqi Ba’ath Party that the only way to stop the spread of
the communists was to overthrow Qasim.
On February 8, 1963, Qasim was overthrown by a coup led by a coalition of the Ba’ath
Party and Arab Nationalist groups within the Iraqi Armed Forces (Citino 2017) (Figure 2.2).
Qasim was unpopular in the Ba’ath Party and among Arab Nationalists, as he was seen as being
too close to the Iraqi Communist Party, which both groups viewed with deep suspicion (Citino
2017). Qasim’s critics were also concerned that although he rejected western influence in Iraq,
he was quick to establish friendly relations with the USSR. This was seen as simply trading one
meddling foreign power for another, generating sympathy for the Ba’athist coup.
After Qasim's overthrow and execution, members of the Ba’ath Party engaged in a hunt for
communists and their allies (Figure 2.2). Approximately 5000 people were killed as part of this
purge. The Ba’athists also shifted from a true Ba’athist movement to a Neo-Ba’athist movement.
Neo-Ba’athism arose in both Iraq and Syria during the 1960s (Bengio 1998). It is distinct among
Ba’athist movements as it relies on authoritarian government and strong military--government
ties. Unity through military endeavors is a hallmark of Neo-Ba’athism, whereas true Ba’athism
emphasizes civilian strength and unity (Bengio 1998).
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The coup succeeded primarily due to the support of the military as the Arab Socialist
Ba’ath Party was not strong enough to take power alone. The Ba’ath Party made a deal with Abd
ar-Razzaq an-Naif, the deputy head of military intelligence, and Ibrahim Daud, the head of the
Republican Guard. Naif and Daud knew that Arif's and Tahir Yahya's government was weak, but
they also knew that the Ba’athists needed strong military support for success. For his
participation, Naif demanded to be given the post of Prime Minister after the coup. Daud was
given the post of Minister of Defense. However, unbeknownst to Naif and Daud, al-Bakr had
told the Ba’ath leadership in pre-coup secret meetings that the two would be liquidated either
during or after the revolution (Coughlin 2005).

Saddam Hussein, then the vice chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council,
worked to establish the party's security and intelligence organization to combat its enemies,
including tying up loose ends within the party (Figure 2.2 and 2.3). Naif was invited to lunch at
the Presidential Palace with al-Bakr on July 30th 1968, during which Saddam burst into the room
and threatened Naif with death. Saddam ordered Naif to leave Iraq immediately if he chose life
(Coughlin 2005). Naif was exiled to Morocco. An assassination attempt in 1973 was
unsuccessful, but he was assassinated in London on the orders of Saddam in 1978. Daud was
exiled to Saudi Arabia shortly after Naif (Coughlin 2005). Al-Bakr strengthened his position in
the party with the help of Saddam's party security apparatus and the intelligence services. Most
of 1968 was used to repress non-Ba’athist thought and groups; for instance, a campaign against
Nasserists and communists was initiated by Saddam's command (Tripp 2007) (Figure 2.2).
Several spy plots were created by the party; spies who were "caught" were accused of being a
part of a Zionist plot against the state (Tripp 2007).

24

Figure 2.3. Saddam Hussein (left) and President al-Bakr (right) in 1978.
(https://www.flickr.com/photos/ethiosudanese/4149880302/)
The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) was highly skeptical of the legitimacy of the Ba’athist
government, as many of its members remembered the anti-Communist campaign launched
against them in 1963. Al-Bakr offered the ICP cabinet positions in the government; the ICP
rejected this offer. Al-Bakr responded by initiating a systematic campaign against the ICP and
Communist sympathizers. The Ba’ath Party believed that the ICP was a threat to the neoBa’athist agenda (Tripp 2007).
By the mid-1970s, Saddam's power within the Ba’ath Party and the government had
grown; he was de facto leader of Iraq, although al-Bakr was officially president, Ba’ath Party
leader and Revolutionary Command Council chairman (Figure 2.2). In 1977, after protests by
Shia Muslims against the Sunni dominated government, al-Bakr relinquished his control over the
Ministry of Defense; Adnan Khairallah Tulfah, Saddam's brother-in-law, became Defense
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Minister. This appointment emphasized the clan-like character of the Ba’ath Party. At the end of
1977, al-Bakr had virtually no control over Iraq as president. Saddam initiated a brutal antiCommunist campaign even though the ICP had no real power, as its leading officials had left the
country or already been imprisoned or executed by the Ba’athists. The campaign also targeted
Ba’athists who did not support Saddam or his progressively Neo-Ba’athist views. In response to
the Iranian Revolution, several prominent Iraqi Shias revolted against the Sunni-led government,
which led to the collapse of the Ba’ath Party in certain areas of the country. This chaos allowed
Saddam to take over the offices of President, Ba’ath Party leader and Revolutionary Command
Council chairman. Immediately after Saddam seized power, over 60 members of the Ba'ath Party
and the government leadership were charged with fomenting an anti-Iraqi Ba’athist plot in
collaboration with al-Assad and the Damascus-based Syrian Ba’ath Party (Tripp 2007).
Following the campaign, Saddam entered the Arab-world stage.
Although initially neo-Ba’athist, Saddam’s political ideology quickly shifted to
Saddamist Ba’athism or Saddamism (al-Marashi and Salama 2008; Bengio 1998). This unique
ideology involved several important tenets. First, Iraq was represented as the center of the Arab
world historically, currently, and in future (Bengio 1998). All aspects of Arab culture were
viewed as flowing out of Iraq, which was considered the pinnacle of Arab cultural development.
Second, the modern people of Iraq were represented as descended directly from the Babylonian
and Assyrian peoples with no external admixture (Bengio 1998; Niblock 1982). This was
especially important to Saddamist thought as it allowed for a commonality to be forged between
the diverse Iraqi ethnic groups. Third, Marxist concepts of class struggle and state atheism were
western-centric and not universally applicable concepts. Socialist theory had to be developed in
accordance with each nation’s unique character (Niblock 1982). Saddam looked to Ho Chi Minh
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and Fidel Castro as leaders who were able to create socialist movements in non-western
countries while maintaining their nation’s independence from the global socialist system led by
the USSR (Niblock 1982).

Saddam quickly developed a cult of personality, which further spread Saddamism in Iraq.
He was represented as the “Father of the Nation” and of the Iraqi people and likened (encouraged
by his own pronouncements) to Nebuchadnezzar II, the longest-reigning and most powerful ruler
of the Neo-Babylonian Empire (c. 605- c. 562 BCE) (De Cesari 2015). The remaining Ba’ath
Party also contributed to the Saddamist cult of personality; by the end of 1979 it was a
nationwide organization and became a propaganda center for pro-Saddam literature (Tripp
2010). The propaganda campaign created a common sense of nationhood for many Iraqis. The
Shia were not happy with Saddam’s Sunni-led government and protests continued despite these
propaganda campaigns. The establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran influenced many Shias
to stand up against Saddam’s Sunni-dominated government.

At first relations between Iran and Iraq were stable, but major ideological differences
could not remain concealed forever. The new Iranian leadership was composed of Shia Islamists,
while the Iraqi Ba’athists were Sunni. Shia and Sunni differ on their interpretation of how
leadership of Islam should be passed on. Shiites (Shia) believe that the Prophet Muhammad’s
descendants should hold positions of power within Islam, whereas Sunnis don’t believe that
Islamic spiritual leadership should necessarily be determined by heritage. Tehran was concerned
about the Iraqi government's continued repression of Iraqi Shias (Tripp 2010). In 1980, border
clashes took place between the two countries. Iraq considered the newly established Iran to be

27

weak as it was in a state of continual civil unrest, and the Iranian leaders had purged thousands
of officers and soldiers simply because of their political views.

Based on differences in military size and development it was assumed that the Iran–Iraq
War would result in a quick Iraqi victory. Saddam's plan was to strengthen Iraq's position in the
Persian Gulf and on the Arab world stage, a feat necessary to legitimize himself as heir to
Babylon. A quick victory would restore Iraq's control over all of Shatt al-Arab, an area which
Iraq had lost to Iran in 1975. On September 17, 1980, Iraq conducted several preemptive strikes
on Iran. Saddam believed that the Iranian government would have to disengage in order to
survive. Saddam overestimated the strength of the Iraqi military, while the Iranian government
saw the invasion as a test of the revolution itself and all its achievements, inspiring them to not
capitulate (Tripp 2010) (Figure 2.2).

In 1982, Iran counter-attacked and was successful in driving the Iraqis back into Iraq. The
defeats of 1982 were a blow to Iraq. With the economic situation worsening because of falling
oil prices (and the rising military budget), the Iraqi standard of living worsened. The war
developed into a stalemate with neither side gaining any ground nor achieving any strategic
victories. The Iraqi government shifted focus on Iraqi Kurdistan which had revolted due to
dissatisfaction with Saddam’s government and the efforts of clandestine Iranian forces. Saddam
appointed his cousin Ali Hasan al-Majid as military chief in Kurdistan. Al-Majid initiated the alAnfal campaign in which chemical weapons were used against civilians (Tripp 2010). In April
1988, a ceasefire was agreed between Iraq and Iran, however no peace treaty was signed (Figure
2.2).
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In the aftermath of the Iran–Iraq War, Saddam focused on rebuilding Iraq’s economy and
reuniting the Iraqi people after eight years of war. He worked to increase oil output to compete
with foreign oil manufacturers. Within Iraq, Saddam focused on restoring ancient sites and
educating the population on the importance of these places to Iraqi national identity (Figure 2.4).

Figure 2.4. Saddam era reconstruction of the Great Ziggurat of Ur at Ali Air base
(https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ancient_ziggurat_at_Ali_Air_Base_Iraq_2005.jpg)
In 1990 Saddam ordered the invasion of Kuwait to help fund his national identity
restoration projects, with the professed goal of uniting Kuwait with Iraq. Kuwait was considered
by many Iraqis to be part of Iraq, as the modern border had been only recently established by the
British for their own interests (Brown 1994). The invasion led to an international outcry; the
United Nations, United States and the United Kingdom condemned the invasion and introduced
sanctions against Iraq, and the Soviet Union and several Arab states also condemned the
invasion. The Persian Gulf War was initiated by a United States-led coalition, which succeeded
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in winning the war in less than a year (Figure 2.2). Several days before the Gulf War ceasefire
was signed in Safwan, the Saudi Arabia-based radio station Voice of Free Iraq (funded and
operated by the Central Intelligence Agency) broadcast a message to the Iraqis to rise up and
overthrow Saddam (Fisk 2005). The speaker on the radio was Salah Omar al-Ali, a former
member of the Ba’ath Party. Al-Ali's message urged the Iraqis to overthrow the Saddam regime.
The broadcast encouraged Iraqis to "stage a revolution" and claimed that "[Saddam] will flee the
battlefield when he becomes certain that the catastrophe has engulfed every street, every house
and every family in Iraq" (Fisk 2005:646). Believing that coalition forces would support the
uprising, a nationwide rebellion against Saddam's rule began in March 1991, which was quickly
repressed by Saddam's loyalist forces. The UN established a no-fly zone to halt the advance of
Saddam's forces. Instead of wasting resources occupying Iraqi Kurdistan, the Kurdish
Autonomous Republic was established, with thousands of Iraqi troops stationed at the IraqiKurdish border.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, U.S. president George W. Bush
included Saddam in his Axis of Evil. In 2002 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1441,
which stated that Iraq had failed to fulfill its UN obligations by refusing to abandon its weapons
of mass destruction program, a violation of UN Resolution 687 (Borger 2004). This claim was
based on documents provided by the CIA and the British government that were later found to be
unreliable (Borger 2004). The United States and the United Kingdom would use Resolution 1441
as a pretext for a ground invasion. In 2003 the US-led invasion of the country forced the Ba’ath
Party and Saddam to go into hiding. Saddam was captured that year and was publicly executed in
2006.
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After the invasion, the United States established the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) to govern Iraq. In May 2003 Lewis Paul Bremer, the chief executive of the CPA, issued
orders to exclude Ba’ath Party members from the new government (CPA Order 1) and to disband
the Iraqi Army (CPA Order 2) (Pfiffner 2010) (Figure 2.5). The order to disband the Sunnidominated Iraqi Army excluded many of the country's experienced government officials from
participating in the country's governance structure, an action that created a prime recruiting
ground for extremist groups (Pfiffner 2010). Thousands of Iraqi academics, professors, doctors
and over 40,000 schoolteachers were prevented from employment, including those who had
joined the Ba’ath Party simply to keep their jobs, further shaping the chaotic post-invasion
environment (Pfiffner 2010).

Elements of the former Iraqi secret police and army formed guerrilla units and engaged in an
insurgency against the US-led coalition rule of Iraq. In fall 2003, self-proclaimed 'jihadist' groups
began targeting coalition forces. Many members of these groups were unemployed Iraqi soldiers.
In the ensuing chaos the unity that Saddam had forged fractured further as Sunni militias were
created in Sunni-dominated communities and intense inter-ethnic violence between Sunnis and
Shias dominated Iraqi cites. The Mahdi Army – a Shia militia created in 2003 – began to fight
the coalition forces in 2004 (Jackson 2007) (Figure 2.5). Sunni and Shia militants also fought
against the new Iraqi Interim Government that was installed in June 2004. The Sunni militia
Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad became Al-Qaeda in Iraq in October 2004 and targeted coalition
forces as well as civilians, predominantly Shia Muslims, worsening ethnic tensions.

In January 2005, the first elections were held since the invasion and a new Constitution
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Figure 2.5 Timeline of Iraqi Political events from 2003 to the present.

was approved (Figure 2.5). In late 2006, the US government's Iraq Study Group recommended
that the US begin focusing on training Iraqi military personnel as they were more suited to
interacting with the diverse populations of Iraq, similar to the US attempts at Vietnamization
four decades earlier (Miller 2020). In May 2007, Iraq's Parliament called on the United States to
set a timetable for withdrawal. The Iraqi government signed the US–Iraq Status of Forces
Agreement, which required US forces to withdraw from the cities by June 30, 2009 and to
withdraw completely from Iraq by December 31, 2011 (Figure 2.5).

After the withdrawal of US troops in 2011, the insurgency continued and Iraq suffered
from rampant political instability. In February 2011, the Arab Spring protests spread into Iraq.
Unlike in Egypt, initial protests did not topple the Iraqi government. In 2012 and 2013, violence
increased and armed groups inside Iraq were increasingly stimulated by the Syrian Civil War,
which was yet another conflict involving a Ba’athist regime. During 2013, Sunni militants
increased attacks targeting Shia populations in an attempt to undermine the Nouri al-Maliki-led
government. In 2014, Sunni insurgents under the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
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terrorist group seized large swathes of land including several major Iraqi cities, including Tikrit,
Fallujah and Mosul, displacing hundreds of thousands of people and resulting in the plundering
of both natural and cultural resources. Bowing to the protests, Maliki stepped down as Prime
Minister to back al-Abadi in order to safeguard the interests of the country. On September 9,
2014, Haider al-Abadi formed a new government and became the new Prime Minister. Fighting
between Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish factions led to debate about splitting Iraq into three
autonomous regions along cultural lines, including Sunni Kurdistan in the northeast, a Sunnistan
(for Sunni) in the west and a Shiastan (for Shia) in the southeast (Committee on Foreign
Relations 2015). The evidence used to support these claims was based on the geographical
distribution of adherents and not archaeological evidence.

In response to rapid territorial gains made by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL) during spring 2014, and its universally-condemned executions and reported human rights
abuses, many western states began to intervene against it in the Iraqi Civil War (2014–2017)
(Figure 2.5). Tens of thousands of civilians have been killed in Iraq in ISIL-linked violence. The
genocide of Yazidis by ISIL has led to the expulsion, flight and effective exile of the Yazidis
from their ancestral lands in Northern Iraq. Since 2015, ISIL has lost territory in Iraq, including
Tikrit in March and April 2015, Baiji in October 2015, Sinjar in November 2015, Ramadi in
December 2015, Fallujah in June 2016 and Mosul in July 2017. By December 2017, ISIL had no
remaining territory in Iraq, following the 2017 Western Iraq campaign (Figure 2.5).

Brief History of Archaeology in Iraq
The first documented archaeological excavation in Mesopotamia was led by Abbé Pierre
Joseph Beauchamp (1752-1801), a French diplomat, clergyman and astronomer who uncovered
the sculpture now generally known as the "Lion of Babylon" (Kramer 1963). Abbé Beauchamp
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recorded his travels in memoirs published in 1790 and created a sensation in the scholarly world
that resulted in numerous archaeological expeditions to Iraq in the decades that followed.
One of the first challenges in studying the archaeology of Iraq that early scholars had to
face was the decipherment of the triangular markings inscribed on many of the artifacts and ruins
uncovered at Mesopotamian sites. In 1700 Thomas Hyde (1636-1703) named these markings
“cuneiform” but determined that they were not a script but decorative marks, as earlier scholars
had suggested. Although Hyde was the first to name the writing, other scholars were also
examining the marks and were able to determine that they did indeed constitute a script (Kramer
1963). In 1778 Carsten Niebuhr (1753-1815), a Danish mathematician, published accurate copies
of three trilingual inscriptions from the ruins at Persepolis (Kramer 1963). Niebuhr argued that
the inscriptions were written from left to right, and that each of the three inscriptions contained
three different types of writing, which he labeled Class I, Class II, and Class III.
Class I was found to be alphabetic in nature and consisted of 44 characters. It was written
in Old Persian and was first deciphered by Georg Friedrich Grotefend (1775-1853) and Henry
Creswicke Rawlinson (1810-1895) between 1802 and 1848 (Sayce 2019). Class II proved more
difficult to translate. In 1850, Edward Hincks (1792-1866) published a paper explaining that
Class II was not alphabetical, but was in fact both syllabic and ideographic, a discovery that led
to its translation between 1850 and 1859 (Cathcart 2011). At first the language of the inscriptions
called Babylonian or Assyrian but is now known to be Akkadian. As the study of cuneiform
progressed a debate arose as to whether it had connections to the contemporary Semitic residents
in the region. In 1850, Edward Hincks suggested that cuneiform was instead invented by a nonSemitic people who had preceded the Semites in Babylon (Kramer 1963; Cathcart 2011). In
1853, Sir Henry Rawlinson came to a similar conclusion and the Class III inscriptions were
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understood to have been written in this more ancient language, which was dubbed "Akkadian" or
"Scythian", but is now known to be Sumerian (Kramer 1963). This was the first indication that
this older culture and people, the Sumerians, existed at all.
In 1811, Claudius James Rich (1787-1821), an Englishman and operative for the East
India Company in Baghdad, began mapping the ruins of Babylon and Nineveh (Kramer 1963).
Before his death at the age of 34, he wrote two memoirs about the ruins of Babylon and the
inscriptions found there. He collected numerous inscribed bricks, tablets, boundary stones, and
cylinders, including the famous Cylinder of Nebuchadnezzar and the Sennacherib Cylinder. This
collection became the nucleus of the Mesopotamian antiquities collection at the British Museum
(Kramer 1963). This removal of Mesopotamian antiquities by collectors and archaeologists to
western museums would characterize the 19th century and eventually lead to efforts by Saddam
Hussein’s government to have artifacts repatriated to Iraq (Macaskill 2002; Al-Ansary 2009)
Systematic excavation of Mesopotamian sites truly began in 1842 with the explorations
of Paul Emile Botta (1802-1870), the French consul at Mosul (Lloyd 1980). The excavations
of Botta at Khorsabad and those of the English antiquarian Sir Austen Henry Layard (18171894) at Nimrud and Nineveh, paired with the successful decipherment of cuneiform script,
opened up a new world of archaeological potential. Layard's discovery of the library
of Assurbanipal in 1849 put the resources for reconstructing the ancient life and history
of Assyria and Babylon into the hands of scholars (Lloyd 1980). He also was the first to excavate
in Babylonia, where Claudius James Rich had already done some useful topographical work.
During excavations at Nimrud and Nineveh (1852-1854) Hormuzd Rassam (1826-1910), an
Ottoman archaeologist, discovered the epic of Gilgamesh, which was later deciphered by George
Smith (1840-1876) and determined to be the oldest work of literature in the world (Reade 1993).
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An expedition was sent by the British Museum between 1877 and 1879 under the direction of
Hormuzd Rassam to continue his work at Nineveh and its environs. This included excavations in
the mounds of Balaw~t, called Imgur-Bel by the Assyrians, 15 miles east of Mosul, resulting in
the discovery of a small temple dedicated to the God of Dreams by Ashurnasirpal II (Reign 883859BCE), containing a stone ark in which were found two inscribed alabaster tablets of
rectangular shape. Also uncovered was a palace that had been destroyed by the Babylonians but
was restored by Shalmaneser III (Reign 859-824 BCE) (Reade 1993). The latter also erected the
bronze gates with hammered reliefs that are now displayed in the British Museum (Kramer
1963).
In 1878 the palace of Ashurbanipal at Nimrud was excavated and hundreds of enameled
tiles were uncovered (Reade 1993). Two years later, Rassam was sent to Babylonia, where he
discovered the site of the temple of the Sun God of Sippara at Abu Habba, making it possible to
identify the location of the two Sipparas, or Sepharvaim, mentioned in the Bible (Reade 1993).
The French consul Ernest de Sarzec (1832-1901) conducted excavations at ancient Girsu
between 1877 and 1881, uncovering monuments of the pre-Semitic age that included the diorite
statues of Gudea, ruler of Lagash, the stone of which (according to the inscriptions found on
them) was brought from Magan in the Sinai Peninsula (Kramer 1963). The subsequent
excavations of de Sarzec at Telloh and its environs pushed the city’s history back to at least 4000
BCE. A collection of more than 30,000 tablets was found there that were still arranged on
shelves dating to the time of Gudea when the excavators uncovered them (Kramer 1963).
In 1886–1887 a German expedition under Dr. Robert Koldewey (1855-1925) explored
the cemetery of El Hiba, south of Telloh, shedding light on the burial customs of ancient
Babylon (Kramer 1963). Another large-scale German expedition was dispatched by
36

the Orientgesellschaft in 1899 with the object of exploring the ruins of Babylon, the palace
of Nebuchadnezzar II, and the great processional road. Dr Walter Andrae (1875-1956) a member
of Dr. Koldewey’s expedition, subsequently conducted excavations at Qal'at Sherqat, the site
of Assur (Pedde 2015). The Turkish government also funded excavation work in Iraq. In 1897,
Jean-Vincent Scheil (1858-1940) excavated numerous tablets on the site of Sippara and these
tablets made their way to the National Museum at Istanbul (Kramer 1963).
As always, the dark side of archaeology reared its head in the form of the looting of
Mesopotamian antiquities for profit, an activity that plagued the 19th century excavations. As
early as 1888, the British Museum was concerned enough to send investigators to Baghdad to
confirm the sudden appearance of cuneiform tablets on the local art market as coming from
already excavated sites (Kramer 1963). The Museum's detective purchased several tablets and
confirmed they had been stolen by site guards and excavators who had worked with Hormuzd
Rassam years earlier.
By the early 20th century, European and American archaeologists in Mesopotamia had
begun to adopt "the German method" — the earlier practice of searching for tablets and displayquality artifacts was replaced by a desire to understand the evolution of a site over time, and the
context in which artifacts are found, an approach pioneered by Robert Koldewey 1886 (Kramer
1963).
After the First World War, the provinces of the old Ottoman Empire were replaced by a
League of Nations under the control of the victorious powers. Gertrude Bell (1868-1926) played
a pivotal role during this period, as the Oriental Secretary of the British Embassy, in the creation
of Iraq as a national entity (Wallach 1996). Bell also directed the Iraqi Antiquities Service under
the British and became the driving force behind the founding of the Iraq National Museum in
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Baghdad (Wallach 1996). At Bell's insistence, archaeologists were obliged to adopt rigorous
recovery, recording and curation standards, excavation permits limited archaeologists to work
only at a single location, and the majority of finds would henceforth remain in Iraq, to be stored
and displayed at the National Museum (Wallach 1996).
Leonard (1880-1960) and Kathrine Woolley (1888-1945) exemplified Bell’s standards in
their excavations at Ur during the 1920s and early 1930s, which drew the public's attention to
ancient Mesopotamia as Howard Carter’s excavations in the Valley of the Kings had done in
Egypt (Winstone 1990). The Woolley's most sensational discoveries came from the Royal
Cemetery at Ur in what came to be known as the "Great Death Pit" (Winstone 1990).
Leonard Woolley also played a role in assembling the chronology of Mesopotamian
prehistory. His work at Tell al Ubaid, Seton Lloyd's (1902-1996) work at Samarra, Max
Mallowan's (1904-1978) work at various sites (Chagar Bazar, Arpachiya, Nineveh), Ernst
Herzfeld’s (1879-1948) excavations at Hassuna, Stephen Langdon’s (1876-1937) at Jemden, and
Max von Oppenheim's (1860-1946) work at Tell Halaf, all established the pottery-based
associations for the Mesopotamian cultures known through textual evidence (Kramer 1963).
Researchers from the Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago also played a role in these
discoveries and interpretations. Significantly, the implementation of the Iraq Antiquities Law in
1934 mandated that archaeological discoveries could not leave the country without an official
permit (Kramer 1963).
After the Second World War in the mid-20th century, scientific advances in other fields,
such as the 1949 invention of radiocarbon dating, spurred a series of interdisciplinary
investigations by the Oriental Institute's Robert Braidwood (1907-2003) at Jarmo on the
transition to agriculture and urbanism (CPTR Iraq 2006). Large-scale archaeological survey
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techniques introduced by the Oriental Institute in the 1930s managed to reconstruct the ancient
built environment and changing patterns of settlement at specific sites and entire regions
stretching over thousands of years (CPTR Iraq 2006).
The "Golden Age of Iraq Archaeology" began after the Second World War. The 1950s
through the early 1980s were the most fertile period of scientific discovery in Iraq at sites both
historic and pre-historic (CPTR Iraq 2006). Although Iraq experienced several violent regime
changes during this time, each of these successive political regimes was very protective of Iraq’s
cultural heritage. The most prominent was the Ba’athist regime, which viewed Iraqi archaeology
as an important part of the nation’s identity and was quick to both politicize archaeology and
support archaeological research. In 1979, the Iranian Revolution closed Iran to foreign
archaeologists, some of whom redirected their efforts toward excavation of sites in Iraq,
especially eastern Iraq. Archaeological research continued intermittently even during the IranIraq War (CPTR Iraq 2006). Large scale restoration projects were also conducted by the Iraqi
government throughout the 1980s but as the war with Iran dragged on, funding for these projects
became scarce.
With Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent UN response, including
Operation Desert Storm and 12 years of UN-mandated economic sanctions (1991-2003), foreign
participation in archaeological excavations in Iraq ground to a halt. As a result, newer
technologies — such as GPR (ground penetrating radar), magnetometry, satellite imaging and
GIS mapping and database systems — had rarely been used on Iraqi archaeological sites (CPTR
Iraq 2006). These technologies had been used at sites in Syria and Turkey and have been used to
reinterpret discoveries already made in Iraq, for example, at Uruk (CPTR Iraq 2006). The other
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result of the UN sanctions was an uptick in looting at sites, partially due to mass layoffs of site
guards and the catastrophic economic climate of Iraq in the late 1990s.
In the new millennium, as a result of years of site looting, over ten years of UN-mandated
economic sanctions, and the 2003 Coalition invasion of Iraq, the fall of Baghdad, the looting of
the Iraq National Museum, and burning of the Iraq National Archives, thousands of artifacts and
associated knowledge representing nearly 150 years of archaeology in Mesopotamia have been
lost (CPTR Iraq 2006). Many objects found their way onto the black market or were destroyed
during the invasion or subsequent unrest. The rise of the Islamic state in the aftermath of the US
withdrawal led to expanded looting and site destruction. Some limited excavations are still
underway in Iraq, especially prehistoric-focused projects in northeastern Iraq in Iraqi-Kurdistan
where there is more stability (Kopanias et al. 2015) but in general the systematic exploration of
archaeological sites has been largely put-on hold. Although the current Iraqi government
supports archaeological investigations the extent to which these excavations can operate safely is
limited by the infrastructural and security situation in the country.
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Chapter 3: The Impact of Political Systems on Archaeological Resources
Nationalism and Archaeological Resources
Archaeological resources such as sites, artifacts, and research have been used by different
governments in a number of ways historically. These resources have a substantial amount of
potential power by allowing whoever controls them to control the collective memory of a people.
In many contexts governmental control of archaeology is deeply tied to nationalism and the
ideology of the nation’s controlling regime. Nationalism itself penetrates all aspects of a society,
including things buried beneath the earth. The interplay between archaeology and nationalism
has been examined by many scholars (Trigger 1984; Kohl and Fawcett 1989, among others) in
an attempt to understand how the two can affect each other. Many nationalist movements are in
one way or another reliant on a specific interpretation of archaeological research to validate their
existence. There is a difference between national archaeology and nationalist archaeology,
however. National archaeology is simply a collection of archaeological evidence from within the
geopolitical borders of a particular nation-state, while nationalist archaeology makes use of
archaeological data for political ends (Kohl 1998). Nationalist archaeology implies the existence
of national archaeology but the reverse is not necessarily the case.
In most cases archaeologists need the support of governments for research funding and
legal rights to excavate (Trigger 1984; Sommer 2017). Many museums are at least partially
funded by governments and as such governments have some sway over how the past is presented
in this context as well. For example, the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, DC receives
64% of its funding from the Federal government (Smithsonian Institution 2020). Nationalist and
authoritarian regimes will often turn to archaeology for validation in the form of a narrative that
gives structure to a nation’s history. Various regimes throughout history have attempted to use
history and archaeology to create a stronger sense of national unity. In 19th century Europe, the
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interest in archaeological research was partially influenced by the strong nationalism that
characterized the post-Napoleonic era (Trigger 1984). Social class disparity may have also
played a role in cementing the link between nationalism and archaeology. By creating a narrative
of national unity nationalist archaeologists can distract the population from recognizing class
inequality. This type of redirection of energy is an effective tactic used to keep large populations
focused, comparable to the way contemporary US political factions will use a perceived common
foe to attract followers that would normally be at odds.
National prestige is a powerful driving force behind governmental control of
archaeology. Modern day Egypt is a great example of a government using its archaeological
resources to bolster national prestige. This practice dates back to 19th century European
imperialism, as a result of which French and English colonial forces gathered ancient works of
art from all around the world and filled their respective national museums with them in an
attempt to highlight the dominance of their modern states. The main motivation was not to
research these ancient cultures or to try to rewrite their national historic narratives; rather the
seizing of archaeological resources was an attempt to validate the current power of their modern
states. However, over time this practice evolved into a cultural inheritance mindset through
which various European nations attempted to represent themselves as the inheritors of ancient
cultures such as Egypt or Rome. France, Germany and England funded major archaeological
expeditions around the world but focused heavily on North Africa and the Middle East as
discussed in Chapter 2. The character of these expeditions was extremely competitive, with each
team believing that their national pride was at stake if they did not gather up as much
archaeological material as possible (Kohl 1998). This interest in acquiring archaeological
remains from distant lands meant that many prehistoric European sites were completely ignored.
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In late 19th century Germany for example an emphasis on Mesopotamian and Hellenistic Greek
archaeology meant that the archaeological sites located within the borders of Germany were
largely ignored from a research standpoint but were subjected to looting by local antiquarians.
Consequently, the national archaeology of Germany was mostly untouched research wise until
after the First World War. With the German economy in ruins, overseas work was more difficult
so sites closer to home would have become more enticing. This coupled with the rise of National
Socialism and its nativist and racist approach to prehistoric archaeology led to more sites within
Germany being studied (Arnold 1990, 2006). Unfortunately for scholarship at the time, these
studies were so deeply intertwined with the destructive ideological program of the Nazi regime
that the interpretation of data gathered at these sites was politically compromised. In these Nazi
era projects, archaeological evidence of social hierarchy in ancient cultures was often ignored in
favor of a racial hierarchal narrative, intent on proving the superiority of the Germanic people
(Arnold 2006). Classical Near Eastern civilizations were viewed by some elements in the Nazi
government as tainted due to their proximity to racially inferior multicultural groups (Arnold
2006). Nazi Germany was not attempting to represent itself as an inheritor of classical empires
(as Mussolini did in Italy), it was attempting to increase its national prestige via displays of other
cultures to highlight its own perceived superiority. The fusion of national archaeology and
nationalist archaeology is clearly visible in Nazi Germany and serves as a warning for how
dangerous this combination can be.
Archaeology can be used as a tool to identify a national or cultural origin point which can
in turn support a nationalist regime. Most national bodies claim to have an identified origin, or a
critical moment when a group of past peoples suddenly becomes a new people. This is similar to
how some modern Americans view the US War of Independence as a shift from being British
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colonial subjects to a new uniquely American identity. A nation will often trace its history back
to a specific moment like a battle, revolution or declaration, and every historical event that
comes after is treated as the historical property of that nation. The further back in time a nation
can trace its roots, the more validity its sovereign and controlling regime can lay claim to. The
Chinese government has worked extensively to self-validate its power through this process
(Friedman 1994; Sommer 2017; Trigger 1984), for example. This perceived national unity and
validity may result in the misrepresentation of archaeological remains as being related to the
contemporary group in power.
The discovery of a previously unidentified archaeological phenomenon can result in a
national label being assigned to it. The lake dwelling sites in Switzerland are a good example of
conveniently connecting national identity to archaeological sites. Being geographically situated
between Germany, Austria, Italy, and France, Switzerland has been influenced by the cultures of
all the nations that surround it (Sommer 2017). This influence from multiple vectors is one
reason why the Swiss lacked a single national origin narrative and as a result a were
characterized by a certain degree of disunity. The discovery of the Neolithic and Bronze Age
lake dwelling sites at the end of the 19th century was seen as uniquely Swiss (although in fact
such sites are found as far east as Slovenia) and the government immediately coopted it as a
national symbol (Sommer 2017). The appropriation of the lake dwellers as a proto-Swiss group
filled the void the Swiss felt as a nation.
When national unity is weakly developed in a country, archaeological resources can be
used as a morale booster. In post-WW II Denmark, for example, a renewed interest in the Viking
era was effectively used to create sense of national unity (Trigger 1984) by emphasizing
distinctions between the people of Denmark and the other northern European countries. This type
44

of reasoning often assumes that the modern people of a nation-state are ethnically the same as the
past inhabitants. In Denmark this was combined with the archaeologically-based Three Age
System to claim that modern Danes were the same as the people living in the area during the
Iron, Bronze, and Stone Ages (Trigger 1984). Both Mexico and China have also traditionally
emphasized archaeological research as a means to create national unity, Mexico with an
emphasis on Mayan and Aztec sites and China with an emphasis on the Han culture (Trigger
1984; Friedman 1994). Responsible use of archaeology and nationalism does not inherently
distort factors such as race, language, and culture (Kohl and Fawcett 1989). However, the ways
that Viking Age archaeology or Han-centric Chinese archaeology have been used to support
modern national identity would not be considered responsible based on the way Kohl and
Fawcett describe responsible national archaeology. In both of these cases, governments have
deliberately skewed the interpretation and representation of the evidence for different ethnic,
linguistic, and cultural groups in hopes of creating a more glorified version of their history. In the
case of Denmark, the emphasis was on the superiority of the ancient Danes as exemplified by the
fact that they were never conquered by the Romans (Trigger 1984:358). This is also an
irresponsible use of nationalist archaeology, as it implies cultural superiority over other groups
(Kohl and Fawcett 1989). The Third Reich was infamous for using archaeology (Arnold 1990),
biological anthropology (Schafft 2004) and ethnography (Lixfeld 1994) to try to validate the
supposed superiority of their ancestors along with the presumed genetic purity of these ancient
peoples.
Occasionally nationalism and archaeology are used by governments in an attempt to
rewrite the cultural history of a people or region. In such cases a group in power will attempt to
resurrect past cultural traditions and link these to a specific group in the present, regardless of
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whether the group being resurrected is related to them at all. When Yugoslavia changed its name
to the Yugoslav Socialist Republic of Macedonia, the Yugoslavians were attempting to make two
separate claims about their ties to the ancient past. First, they were attempting to de-emphasize
their Slavic heritage by focusing on the ancient kingdom of Macedonia (Silberman 1989). This
use of a single cultural designation ignores over two thousand years of history and cultural
change that occurred between the height of Alexander’s kingdom and the dissolution of the
USSR. Second, by connecting itself to Macedonia, Yugoslav nationalists were attempting to
strengthen their ties to classical Greece (Silberman 1989). This is also problematic as the
Macedonians were not viewed as Greek by the ancient city states and it is only recently that
Macedonia has been associated with Greek culture and vice versa. The approach taken by
Yugoslavia is a perfect example of using archaeology to cherry pick which parts of history
should be considered representative of the nation.
Regimes have also used archaeological resources to justify intrusions or hostile actions
(Trigger 1984). Modern day Israel uses a combination of archaeology, history, and Biblical
studies to justify its existence as a nation as well as its territorial expansion (Feige 2008). While
Biblical era studies are emphasized in Israeli archaeology, prehistoric archaeology is often
overlooked (Trigger 1984). This highlights another common characteristic of nationalist
archaeology in which a specific time period or cultural group receives more emphasis than
others. This is demonstrated in Egypt, where the emphasis traditionally has been placed on
ancient Egyptian civilization, while other periods and groups receive little attention or are
ignored (Trigger 1984). During times of national emergency Egypt has put additional emphasis
on the pharaonic period, and deemphasized other periods of Egyptian archaeology (Silberman
1989). This includes the adoption of ancient symbols by government agencies during the
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governments of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) and Anwar Sadat (1918-1981) (Silberman
1989). This type of adoption can be also seen in the National Socialist German government’s
emphasis on using parts of the runic alphabet to create a connection to their perceived Germanic
past. Possibly the most infamous example of Nazi use of ancient symbology is the appropriation
of the swastika, a generic Indi-European sun symbol used in many cultures, or the use of the
sowlio (Ϟ) rune by the SS organization and the Waffen SS, its paramilitary arm (Windrow 1982).
Regimes that attempt to control archaeological research for their own purposes have a
tendency to suppress knowledge that goes against their doctrines or that challenges the
archaeological institutions they have already created. For example, S. N. Bykovski (1896-1936)
and V. B. Aptekar (1899-1937), two Soviet archaeologists, were executed for challenging the
established archaeological narrative of the ethnic superiority of the Russian people (Kohl and
Fawcett 1995:130). Literally executing scholars whose ideas do not support the regime is an
extreme example of how nationalist archaeology protects itself but other methods such as
ostracization or defunding research that challenges the dominant narrative are more commonly
used and also quite effective.
Finally, when looking at how regimes and governments use archaeology it is important to
ask “Who physically controls archaeological research and materials?” Nationalist movements
will often appropriate histories and symbols. This not cultural appropriation, but rather temporal
appropriation, in the sense that a particular time period is used by descendant communities to
promote a particular agenda in the present. Regimes not only engage in temporal appropriation
but more subtly they can also appropriate research results. During the Pacific War of 1899, for
example, Chile annexed portions of Peru. Along with the capture of strategic territory and
resources, Chile also captured the archaeology of the region (Gänger 2009). They did this by
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literally seizing primary source material from Peru and all the research that went along with it.
This allowed Chile to become an archaeological authority on ancient Peruvian sites and materials
virtually overnight. The intellectual prestige of Chile increased with all this acquired source
material and items of archaeological importance became intertwined with a nationalist
movement. To maintain this prestige the Chilean government sent two major archaeological
expeditions into the newly annexed territory to build on the coopted work of the Peruvian
archaeologists (Gänger 2009). These expeditions had several goals: they were to gather as much
archaeological material as possible by any means necessary and transport them back to the
national museum and they were to survey the newly conquered lands and report back to the
national government on potential strategic and infrastructural use (Gänger 2009). The annexation
of territory and archaeological remains allowed early 20th century Chile to redefine itself as a
scientific authority via a fusion of nationalism and archaeology.
In summary, political systems interact with archaeological resources in four primary
ways: misrepresentation; cooption; annexation; and seizure. Misrepresentation occurs when a
political body misrepresents an archaeological resource to change or influence public perception,
as is seen in Nazi Germany, modern day Israel and China. Cooption is when a national entity
decides to use an archaeological resource to further its own political goals by attempting to show
a linkage between the national entity and the resource, as demonstrated in some Chinese and
Israeli archaeological contexts. Annexation is when knowledge or resources are controlled as
part of a larger gambit, for example European colonial archaeology, which revolved around
archaeological resources as a means of justifying the annexation of territory. Seizure is when a
national entity takes over a resource for its own benefit, as seen when Chile annexed portions of
Peru during the Pacific War of 1899. The nation of Iraq has experienced all of these forms of
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archaeological politicization over the course of its history. The following section will address
how the government of Iraq used archaeology during the regime changes in the second half of
the 20th century and early 21st century.
The Use of Archaeology in Transitions of Power in Iraq
Iraq’s archaeological resources have been influenced by both nationalist and national
archaeology. How Iraq’s successive regimes have used and interacted with its archaeological
past varies deeply over the course of its history. Ba’athist Iraq and Saddam Hussein used
archaeology differently from the post-invasion government and ISIS/ISIL, for example.
Archaeological studies in Iraq were initiated by colonial European nations such as
France, England, and Germany. Archaeological research was almost completely in the hands of
white Europeans and Iraqis themselves often had no idea what was being excavated or why
(Goode 2007). Due to the Mandate for Iraq and the installation of the Hashemite monarchy,
British archaeologists had exceptional access to Iraq beginning in the second half of the 19th
century and most early archaeological research in the region was conducted by the British under
the auspices of the Hashemite government, neither of which was representative of the majority
population.
In the early 1970s the Ba’athist national reforms created an economically and culturally
independent Iraq that enabled more Iraqi archaeologists to receive funding for projects within
Iraq. Although Iraq has more than 6000 years of archaeological heritage, the Ba’athist regime
emphasized Mesopotamian civilization over all others. This may be because the former
colonizers placed so much emphasis on it in their research that Iraqi archaeologists expanded on
the existing data in much the same way as the Chilean government did after the annexation of
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portions of Peru. During the reign of Saddam Hussein, the archaeology of Iraq went through a
further transformation and was fused to his nationalist view of a powerful modern Iraqi nationstate, creating a Saddamist archaeological tradition. Saddam focused on Babylon specifically,
and funded excavations and restorations of various ziggurats and sites using government
resources. These restorations were part of a national strategy to create a unified “Babylonian”
identity in Iraq, comparable to the Macedonian identity featured in Yugoslavian archaeological
attempts to appropriate that aspect of the region’s past. The plan was to create a system of wellfunded, restored, protected and accessible sites that could be visited by the Iraqi public. These
efforts were a major part of Saddam’s 1970s literacy campaign to create a standard education
system in Iraq. At these restored sites Iraqis could explore reconstructed buildings, see artifacts,
shop, eat, and learn about the Ba’athists national narrative for the county. Saddam made sure to
have his name prominently inscribed on the bricks at his reconstructed Babylon as King
Nebuchadnezzar had done before him (Figure 3.1) (De Cesari 2015; Amin 2019).

Figure 3.1. (Left) Brick at Babylon inscribed to commemorate Saddam’s reconstruction of the
wall mimicking Nebuchadnezzar. Photo by Osama Shukir Muhammed Amin
(https://www.ancient.eu/image/9875/saddam-hussein-plaque-in-babylon/). (Right) An Original
Nebuchadnezzar brick from 6th-7th c BCE Babylon.
(https://britishmuseum.withgoogle.com/object/a-building-block-from-babel)
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In Saddam’s reconstruction of the temple of Nebuchadnezzar, he referred to himself as
the son of Nebuchadnezzar and as the force that would glorify Babylon (Amin 2019). This was
part of the campaign to pander to his personal ego and his need to effectively indoctrinate the
populace to validate his regime’s rule. In fact, Saddam’s personality cult did as much as possible
to present the leader as a Babylonian hero, with art, merchandise, and even coinage being
produced to underline this connection with the ancient past (Figure 3.2). The Iran-Iraq war
slowed down this production and reconstruction mentality but projects continued throughout the
1980s regardless of resource constraints, as the Ba’athists felt these were high priority endeavors.

Figure 3.2. Commemorative coinage depicting Saddam and Nebuchadnezzarr from 1987
(https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285573015_POSTCOLONIAL_RUINS_Archaeologies_of_political_violence_and_IS)

This attempt to engage in temporal appropriation of Babylonian culture did not end with the
cooption of archaeological sites; even the military and infrastructure of Saddam’s Iraq emulated
this heritage. Weapon systems were renamed to elicit Babylonian symbology, such as the
ubiquitous soviet T-72 battle tank, which in Iraqi service was slightly modified for desert use and
nicknamed the ‘Lion of Babylon’ (Cordesman 2003). This adoption of symbols associated with
the archaeological past is not unlike the use of runes on Nazi uniforms and some German
weapon systems during WWII. Public architecture was also redesigned to emulate perceived
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Babylonian styles, as can be seen in the Babylon Oberoi Hotel (aka the Babylon Rotunda
Baghdad Hotel) and several other buildings in Baghdad, including multiple half-scale Ishtar gate
reconstructions at the entrances of public buildings and spaces (Figures 3.3 and 3.4) (Kulić 2015:
Figs. 2, 12). These building projects were halted during the latter half of the Iran-Iraq war,
resulting in some unfinished structures.

Figure 3.3. The Babylon Oberoi Hotel. Image from Building the Non-Aligned Babel: Babylon
Hotel in Baghdad and Mobile Design in the Global Cold War (Kulić 2015: Fig. 12).
(https://journals.openedition.org/abe/docannexe/image/924/img-12.jpg)
Protections for archaeological sites and government oversight were strong during most of
Saddam Hussein’s rule. Sites were well maintained and guarded; looters were punished as capital
offenders for daring to plunder Iraq’s national property. However, after the Persian Gulf War and
subsequent unrest in Iraq, looting began to increase as Saddam’s government was in disarray and
its military forces had either deserted or were severely underfunded throughout the mid-1990s
(Brodie 2011).
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Figure 3.4. Stylized Ishtar gate entrance Baghdad. Image from Building the Non-Aligned Babel:
Babylon Hotel in Baghdad and Mobile Design in the Global Cold War (Kulić 2015: Fig. 2)
(https://journals.openedition.org/abe/docannexe/image/924/img-2.jpg).

Although looting was a constant occurrence, analysis of auction market lots of artifacts
from Iraq spiked during times of civil unrest such as after the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf war, and the
War on Terror (Figure 3.5). The drop in lots immediately after 2003 can be attributed either to
the items stolen being too “hot” to sell or to increased media attention and the work of Interpol
and various academic institutions efforts to bring awareness to the issue. Furthermore, the use of
the term “Iraq” by online retailers rapidly decreases in the post- invasion market and is replaced
by the term “Mesopotamian” (Brodie 2011). This indicates that those engaged in the antiquities
market were very much aware of the potential that these items were in fact stolen. Loosely
defining where these items came from protects both the seller and buyer. While Iraq is a specific
geographical location and political entity, Mesopotamia is not an entity that maps onto any
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modern geopolitical environment. This allows sellers to avoid losing clientele while
circumventing local legislation regulating trade in stolen antiquities.

Figure 3.5. Number of lots of unprovenanced cylinder seals and cuneiform objects offered
annually at Christie’s of London from 1980 to 2006. Years of civil unrest in Iraq during which
sites had less state protection are marked in red (emphasis by author). The years 2004-2006 have
no reliable data, although looting and sales undoubtedly took place (Brodie 2011: 7.1).

Awareness of this potential can in some cases be attractive to prospective buyers
motivated by risk as well as the fiction that the buyer is “saving” the object (Yates and Smith
2019). Online retailers also stopped presenting their full stock of Mesopotamian artifacts but
allowed prospective clients to inquire about non-displayed items, in some cases going so far as to
openly state the buyers should reach out to them privately “off-list” (Brodie 2011). Clients
ranged from individuals to large organizations; a good example of the latter is Hobby Lobby’s
purchase of 5548 artifacts. Beyond just acquiring artifacts to donate to the Museum of the Bible,
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Hobby Lobby used the donation of these artifacts to receive federal tax breaks (Brodie 2020).
Although the number of lots of Mesopotamian goods on the market appears to decrease between
2003 and 2008, it is likely that substantially more antiquities from the region were being sold
than were reported when the amount of money changing hands is considered (Brodie 2011). An
increase in the sale of very rare and unique items, such as Sîn-iddinam barrels, after 2003
indicates a substantial unreported antiquities market developed under cover of the chaos that
accompanied Iraq’s transition of power (Brodie 2011).
Shortly after the 2003 invasion an effort was made by the University of Chicago’s
Oriental Institute to track damages to archaeological sites using aerial and satellite imagery. This
method was s found to be very effective at identifying looting and other site preservation issues.
Overflights were conducted by the Italian Carabinieri with academic support from McGuire
Gibson and John M. Russel using helicopters as early as May 2003. These initial observations
provided the first photographic evidence of mass looting at large sites across southern Iraq, but
due to the limits of time, safety, and geographical scale, these flyover surveys could not
effectively observe small to medium sized sites. Early satellite images confirmed previously
unverified reports that mass looting had occurred at small to medium sized sites as well,
providing a way for archaeologists to examine large tracts of land and avoid the limits of direct
aerial observation. Based on images obtained between 2003 and 2006 it was determined that
looting took place near towns but just far enough on the outskirts of sites so that it would go
more or less unnoticed (Stone 2008). This indicates that locals were the ones mainly engaged in
the looting as opposed to distant groups; it also indicates that the looters needed to be near
resources and were not equipped for prolonged field operations. It was also found that the
majority of sites looted were from the third millennium BCE (Stone 2008), which indicates that
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the looters had targeted them for artifacts with particular market value. The looters also may
have targeted such sites specifically because the Ba’athist regime had put such an emphasis on
that time period. The looters would have been very familiar with this time period and the market
value of such items after years of Ba’athist indoctrination.
Not all of the destruction has been caused by looting. During the 2003 invasion many
archaeological sites fell into ruin or were destroyed by over-zealous weapons fire. For instance,
just outside of the town of Najaf, the restored ruins of several Babylonian structures were
destroyed in an attempt to make room for helicopters until community members and professors
from the local university pleaded with US troops to stop. With the disbanding of the Iraqi
military and police forces, the nation’s museums were looted and countless artifacts made their
way onto the black market (Poole 2008). Iraqi archaeology fell into disarray as museums that
housed archaeological collections were unable to confirm what they did and did not have. The
Baghdad Museum lost over 15,000 artifacts to looting (Bogdanos 2005); the identity of these
looters is still murkily veiled by the fog of war and was not limited to the Baghdad Museum.
Corruption ran rampant within the destabilized regime and artifacts were found, lost, and found
again many times over. This represented a change from the limited looting of pre-invasion Iraq,
illustrating the chaotic nature of Iraqi archaeology under the transitional government.
Archaeological sites were left unprotected and looters dug pits and toppled standing structures in
an attempt to find things to sell. Due to Coalition Provisional Authority Order 2 (one of a series
of orders used by the CPA to restructure Iraq), members of the former regime were not permitted
to participate in the transitional government. This added to the problem as many archaeologists
and academics were members of the former regime, creating an archaeological power vacuum in
the country and destabilizing the archaeological community within Iraq. The same thing had
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happened in Iran after the Revolution (1979) when former regime members were removed from
academic posts as part of a campaign to reject the previous government’s interest in pre-Islamic
archaeology. Tehran’s Department of Archaeology was closed in 1979 and didn’t resume
activities fully until 1990 (Abdi 2001).
Work to preserve archaeological resources was conducted on a local scale in different
Iraqi cities, such as Baghdad, Najaf, and Mosul. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani was instrumental
in stopping large scale looting operations and worked with Italian and US troops to establish
patrols near archaeological sites (Lawler 2008), and the US military (particularly US Army Civil
Affairs) carried out several programs intended to educate US troops on protecting archaeological
resources in country. These stopgap measures had a limited effect and did not create a system of
protections such as those established by the prior regime. The chaos of war gutted institutional
oversight of Iraqi archaeology and transitional government attempts to regulate the situation
were futile at best (Figure 3.6) (Adams 2001). Under the transitional governments some research
conducted during the coalition occupation of Iraq was by private individuals from the US and
UK similar to archaeological projects at the beginning of the 20th century (Adams 2001).
The chaos of Iraq’s transitional government destabilized the protection of archaeological
sites to such an extent that in some cases lawmakers arrested lawmakers. Abdel-Amir Hamdani,
the Director of Antiquities in the Nasiriyeh region of Iraq, was arrested by the Iraqi government
for attempting to enforce protection of archaeological sites when he stopped the building of
several economically important factories (Lawler 2008). In addition, the Iraqi government has
had to break its own heritage protection laws in order to keep its population alive. In several
cases large mounds were destroyed to make way for emergency agricultural projects (Gibson
2003). This is in sharp contrast to the Ba’athist regime’s treatment of archaeological sites and
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clearly shows that the post-Saddam government views its archaeological resources as expendable
and secondary to other priorities, including development.

Figure 3.6. Looter’s Pit and Pot Sherds on the surface at the site of Kish.
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archaeological_looting_in_Iraq#/media/File:A_looter's_pit_(left)
_at_the_ancient_Sumerian_city_of_Kish,_Iraq._Fragments_of_pottery_(right)_are_scattered_ne
ar_the_pit.jpg).

After US and coalition troops withdrew from Iraq, a power vacuum opened up that led to
the rise of ISIS. This organization weaponized the destruction of Iraqi national archaeology in
two ways. First it destroyed or sold any pre-Islamic artifacts it could, a reversal of the Ba’athists’
over-emphasis on pre-Islamic archaeology (Harmanşah 2015). This tactic was successful in
destroying a unified Iraqi identity that might have been fostered by pre-Islamic artifacts. The
second objective was to punish Western powers for their interference in Iraq. The more attention
Western scholars paid to the destruction of sites and artifacts by ISIS the more destruction
occurred (Harmanşah 2015; Arnold 2018). While ISIS/ISIL was never the official government of
Iraq, they did operate as a government in areas they captured and as such they demonstrate
another regime’s treatment of archaeological resources in the region. Regions governed by
ISIS/ISIL were subject to the organization’s objections to idolatry, and as such pre-Islamic
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archaeological resources that could be defined as idolatry – including most figural
representations – were subject to ISIS/ISIL’s destructive wrath. Members of ISIS/ISIL hailed
from over 85 countries and represented multiple ethnicities. Many of these individuals have little
or no connection to Iraq’s archaeological past and would not be disturbed by destroying these
resources.
When considering how Iraq’s archaeological resources were treated by incoming
governments compared to previous regimes several trends emerge. First, Saddam’s Iraq
venerated archaeological resources for their power to influence and control people rather than
purely out of intellectual curiosity. Archaeological evidence in Saddam’s Iraq was treated as a
national resource to be exploited, similar to Iraq’s oil reserves. Saddam’s government relied on
selective exploitation of the archaeological record, a system in which cultural resources with
little political power are ignored in favor of resources that can be exploited (Arnold 1999). This
process can be likened to mining the past for valuable bits of knowledge while discarding the
rest. Secondly, the transitional government of Iraq had other more urgent priorities than
nationalizing archaeological resources. This, coupled with the rejection of Ba’athist policies and
symbolism (as seen in the Constitution of Iraq), may have led to a general disinterest in
archaeology among the transitional governments. This is not to say that there were no concerted
efforts in some departments of government to protect these resources, but on the whole
archaeological resources were not valued as they had been before. Third, ISIS/ISIL’s destruction
of archaeological heritage is a counter-institutional revolt that uses attacks on cultural patrimony
as a medium through which to send a message to the West, a process also seen during Roman
expansion into Europe (Arnold and Fernández-Götz 2020). Although some members of
ISIS/ISIL were former Ba’athist party members under Saddam, their willingness to completely
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reject these resources indicates that they are partly motivated by anarchist impulses to simply
burn everything to the ground and start anew. This contrasts with Saddam’s approach of “we
need to take care of this” and the transitional government’s “we’ll get to it later” approach and
instead asks “Why get to it at all?”. In addition, the prevalence of iconoclastic attitudes among
members of ISIS/ISIL also fueled this destruction. In Islam, iconoclasm is not a general belief
but rather a specific theological attitude held by some toward artistic representation.
Contemporary iconoclastic attitudes are not only displayed by ISIS/ISIL but also in destruction
of Sufi shrines in Mali during the Tuareg rebellion (Tharoor 2012) and the destruction of
Buddhas in Afghanistan (Arnold 2014; Rathje 2001).
These three contrasting approaches to archaeological resources provide us with a window
into what is happening on the ground with Iraqi archaeology and allow us to peer into the
mentality of these regimes through combined political and strategic lenses.
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Chapter 4: Citizen Interactions with Archaeological Resources
In addition to how governments and academia interact with archaeological resources, it is
important to investigate how ordinary people interreact with them as well, since they can have a
major impact on how archaeological resources are treated, valued and represented within a
country. Popular opinion on how these resources should be used is an especially powerful force
when political regimes change.
Due to the climate of the Cold War and the mass destruction of records in the course of
the 2003 invasion of Iraq as well as the more recent Iraqi civil war, there is limited information
available in the west on how the general population may have viewed or interacted with Iraq’s
archaeological resources. To supplement the relative scarcity of primary and secondary
documentary material an examination of governmental policies that impacted the general public,
evidence of looting activity, and first-hand accounts of those who lived under these different
regimes is necessary to identify possible changes in how the people of Iraq viewed their
archaeological resources over time.
Iraq under the Dictator
Finding information on how citizens during the Ba’athist regime operated can be
difficult. Many public records were destroyed by retreating Iraqi forces in 2003, and many more
were lost in the years of chaos that followed. To understand how citizens interacted with
archaeological resources it is necessary to examine in what ways Saddam’s government
emphasized cultural, particularly archaeological, resources to the public, the prevalence of
looting and destruction of sites under Ba’athist control, and what individuals who lived under the
regime are willing to share about their experiences.
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As Iraq’s leader, Saddam was a very self-serving individual whose undertakings were
always based on the potential payout he could gain. He knew that to be a strong leader (and fulfil
his fantasy of being a modern Babylonian king) he would need to obtain and maintain public
support and public interest, which meant creating a strong Iraq. It is unclear whether Saddam
coopted the Iraqi public’s interest in archaeology for his own gains or if the public adopted his
interest in the archaeological past of Iraq to survive under his rule. Undoubtedly there was some
public interest in archaeology unrelated to Saddam’s regime, as is the nature of the field. Saddam
used public imagery to invoke his regime’s ties to the ancient past. A common vector for this
type of propaganda was the public display of murals featuring Saddam and various ancient
Mesopotamian rules such as the lawgiver Hammurabi (Figure 4.1). The mural in this case
juxtaposes portraits of Hammurabi, in the characteristic headgear of a 2nd millennium BC
Babylonian ruler, and Saddam in modern military uniform to reflect Saddam’s view of himself
as bringing law and order to Iraq. The famous Ishtar Gate (currently Berlin) as well as the basalt
stela inscribed with Hammurabi’s Law Code (currently in the Louvre) are also prominently
referenced in the mural and it seems unlikely that these references to objects of Iraqi patrimony
still held in foreign museums was coincidental. These murals were located in schools, public
buildings, and along roadways and were used to send the message to the people that Saddam and
the Ba’athists represented a link between an unbroken lineage from his subjects to ancient Iraq.
Messaging like this was also effective as it circumvented the need for literacy or any formal
knowledge of the subject matter. Because history and archaeology played a substantial role in the
education system, this imagery could then be used by the Ba’athists to further solidify their rule.
This was especially effective as youth educated in this system could then interpret the meaning
of these murals to members of society that didn’t receive this education (CI#2).
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Figure 4.1. Saddam and Hammurabi mural from Babylon. Murals like this one were common at
archaeological sites to remind the people of their (and particularly Saddam’s) connection to the
past. (Getty Contributor; https://www.bbc.com/culture/article/20180419-saddam-disney-for-adespot-how-dictators-exploit-ruins)
Another popular visual Saddam depicted his armed forces as the direct successors of the ancient
Babylonian soldiers seen in the reliefs at archaeological sites. In Figure 4.2 he rides on a chariot
accompanied by modern MiG-25 Fighters, a Mi-8 helicopter, and an Iraqi Coast Guard patrol
boat. The missile in the picture is most likely an Iraqi made “Al Hussein” missile, which is
serving as a representation of the arrows fired from Saddam’s bow. This representation of
Saddam directly mimics the artistic style of ancient Mesopotamia (Figure 4.3) and explicitly
implies continuity and cultural connection between the Ba’athist regime and ancient Iraq. This
type of propaganda was common in public buildings, archaeological sites, and billboards across
central and southern Iraq until the 2003 invasion.
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Figure 4.2. Saddam often mixed his love of ancient Babylon and Mesopotamia more generally
with his love of the military (Getty Contributor https://www.bbc.com/culture/article/20180419saddam-disney-for-a-despot-how-dictators-exploit-ruins).

Figure 4.3. A drawing of a relief from the northwest corner of the Assyrian palace at Nimrud
depicting ancient warriors hunting lions. The resemblance between this relief and how Saddam
portrays himself in Figure 4.2 is striking (Layard 1864;
(https://biblicalarchaeology.org.uk/book_nineveh-and-its-remains_layard.php)

64

Saddam’s public policies were initially considered to be very progressive, especially in a
nation that had been under either Ottoman, colonial, or monarchical rule for 430 years. To
strengthen Iraq and by association his own political position, he worked diligently to modernize
Iraq’s economy, education system, and infrastructure. In emphasizing economic independence,
he moved to create Iraq-owned firms to exploit natural resources in the region. Although
economic independence was critical to creating the Ba’athist vison of a reborn Iraq, Saddam
focused substantially more of his time and resources on social development. It is important to
keep in mind that all of this progress was contingent on loyalty and submission to his
government and personality cult. Healthcare, accessible college, and the elimination of illiteracy
were key social policies backed by Saddam and provided to those loyal to him. These programs
combined with the threat of brutal retaliation garnered him substantial support during the 70s and
early 80s and some of these programs affected the Iraqi population in positive ways. This is
indicative of the paradox that most 20th century dictatorships seem to be wrapped in. On one
hand authoritarian political entities will often emulate progressive practices such as accessible
education, as seen in Nazi Germany, or woman’s suffrage, as seen in the USSR, that are common
in most western democracies, while conversely and simultaneously embracing authoritarian
policies. This paradox could be seen as a way for authoritarian governments to proactively
counteract public distaste for their more brutal control practices. Offering the population services
and limited and contingent rights can help disguise a political entity’s oppressive policies. Iraqis
knew Saddam was a cruel leader but he was also the one creating education reforms and
infrastructural development. Perhaps the population was willing to put up with the oppression in
exchange for the obvious benefits, but more likely they had no means to actually overthrow the
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oppressor. Under those conditions it is expedient to endure and find whatever silver lining one
can.
During his reign Saddam set aside funding to establish 11 public universities and nine
private institutions, including the University of Tikrit, which is one of Iraq’s largest and most
reputable. Iraq also boasted the highest education spending in the region at 5% of GDP (Ranjan
and Jain 2009). These institutions allowed Iraqi students to engage in archaeological research
that would otherwise would have been inaccessible and allowed members of the public to engage
with archaeological resources in a way not seen before in the Middle East. In his general
education reforms, Saddam’s government emphasized ancient Mesopotamian history as a core
subject to be taught in primary school. Students in grades 5-7 participated in courses related to
ancient Babylon three days per week and such courses continued with regularity until graduation
in 12th grade (CI #2). This mass education campaign focused on archaeology and history and
although it was skewed by Ba’athist ideologies it also created a sense of appreciation for cultural
resources in the general public. Coupled with the mass propaganda campaigns intended to paint
Saddam and Iraq as part of a great Mesopotamian inheritance these programs created a sense of
reverence in the public for the country’s archaeological resources.
Archaeology was an exceptional weapon in the Saddam’s arsenal, as it does not require
literacy to be an effective tool for communicating propaganda. Archaeological resources include
physical objects that can be displayed in a museum or restored at sites as well as features in the
landscape that can be visited. Iraq during the 1970s had a very low literacy rate; in 1977 rural
Iraqi literacy rates topped 48.67% (Ranjan and Jain 2009). While Saddam did work to establish
paths to literacy for the Iraqi population, having these populations interact with archaeology was
a highly effective way to indoctrinate them in the meantime. Public artwork and reconstructions
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were used to convey the messages of Saddam’s regime concerning archaeological resources for
those who could not read. Iraqis I spoke to between 2012-2014 and 2018-2020 reported that
during this time Iraq’s archaeological resources were highly respected by most segments of
society as they felt that it was their shared property and part of a common origin narrative.
Saddam also hosted a public festival in the Gardens of Babylon called Al-Mirbad, a month-long
event that showcased Iraq’s ancient art and culture. This festival was comparable to a
Renaissance Festival in the US and included people dressing up in period costume and selling
reproductions of ancient artifacts (Tracy 1989). Its primary objective was to engage and unify
people around the regime’s interpretation of Iraq’s grand history, while its secondary objective
was to allow Saddam a month to play to his ego as the great king of Iraq. Regardless of the
political indoctrination that undoubtedly motivated it, this festival was a popular way for the
Iraqi public to interact with the archaeological record of the region and further cemented the
peoples’ love for the ancient past (Tracy 1989; Iraq Ministry of Culture and Information 1989;
CI #3).
Saddam didn’t necessarily express imperial aspirations with his self-evocation of
Nebuchadnezzar II. While the Neo-Babylonian empire stretched across modern day Iraq and into
the Saini, Saddam didn’t expand much outside Iraq’s borders; instead, he seemed focused on
developing and ruling Iraq within its modern geopolitical borders. His forays into other nations
were primarily concerned with acquiring something that could be used to build up Iraq or to
eliminate a perceived foreign threat, rather than conquering vast swaths of territory. This
restraint may be due to the fact that Saddam understood that although he had a large military he
couldn’t capture and hold large areas without focusing undesirable international attention on his
activities that could destabilize his regime, as in the case of the invasion of Kuwait. When
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Saddam invaded Iran his objectives were to annex portions of the Persian Gulf coastline to
expand Iraq’s costal access to the gulf and to destabilize the Irani government, which Saddam
saw as a threat after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called for the Iraqi people to overthrow the
Ba’athist government in 1979 (Karsh 2002). This didn’t warrant a large international military
response aside from several surgical strikes conducted by the Israeli Airforce in 1981 (Fainberg
1981). Saddam’s expansion into Iran seems to have been primarily focused on consolidating his
rule and served as an opportunity to use his modern military forces against a foreign threat
instead of his own subjects. When he invaded Kuwait in 1990, his objective was to capture
Kuwait’s oil resources to fund further development in Iraq. Among the Iraqi public there was
some belief that Kuwait’s geographic location was actually part of Iraq that had been cut off by
colonial powers, but this notion was only used to make the war appear to be about more than
money (CI #1; CI #3). While territorial expansion is an imperial trait, Saddam’s expansion seems
to have been largely inward facing, concerned primarily with preserving the image of himself as
king of his own kingdom. It seems telling that in his public murals he was careful to associate
himself with constructive leaders like Hammurabi and Nebuchadnezzar but avoided invoking
images of conquerors such as Sargon of Akkad, credited with having created the world’s first
empire.
Saddam’s hybridization of his political agenda and the promotion and protection of
archaeological resources was very effective in creating a period of public stability and cohesion
rarely seen in the modern Middle East. This cohesion was first tested during the Persian Gulf
War, when mass desertion from the military and economic destruction put many of Saddam’s
public archaeological projects on indefinite hold. What Baathist funds remained were channeled
into stabilizing the economy and paying reparations to Kuwait. Many of the sites were shut down
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and fenced off and small groups of soldiers were left to garrison them against looters. Saddam’s
inability to continue providing public services led to the fracturing of the unity he had created
through the 1970s and 1980s. With Saddam’s defeat at the hands of the US in 1991 the cruel
practices of his regime became more of a factor in his popularity. The Iraqi people were not
feeling the sense of unity they had once felt and as a result the regime’s use of archaeology as a
unifying element in the public sector deteriorated steadily. Looting operations expanded in
remote regions with the layoff of many site guards. Auction house data show spikes in
unprovenanced artifacts appearing through the late 1990s (Brodie 2011: Fig. 3.5).
Saddam’s public display of interest in archaeology seems to have faded by the turn of the
millennium. He became reclusive and the Iraqi people saw less and less of him while he spent
much of the early 2000s writing political allegories set in Babylon (Bengio 2002). His four
novels outlined the perceived instances of persecution he had experienced at the hands of the
western powers combined with his vision of creating a new Babylon. These books were made
available to the Iraqi public and Zabibah and the King, The Fortified Castle and Men and the
City were part of the public-school curriculum until 2003. Saddam’s byline was replaced by “a
Novel Written by its Author” to preserve his anonymity and prevent these screeds from looking
like blatant indoctrination. The use of anonymity by someone who publicly styled himself after
Nebuchadnezzar is paradoxical. By the time these books were written Saddam was an older man
and had become increasingly paranoid and reclusive. It is believed but not verifiable that in his
final years Saddam was becoming more and more out of touch with the public and self-conscious
about interacting with people, suggesting he had developed a degree of stage fright and used the
novels as a proxy for appearing at public events. Interestingly, it was no secret to the general
public that he was the author, although it was suspected that he had relied upon ghost writers (CI
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# 4). In addition, Saddam may have been worried about looking weak in the eyes of those critical
of his rule and the release of poorly written books after a decade of military, economic, and
diplomatic humiliation would have given his opponents additional ammunition to argue that he
should be deposed.
Saddam’s waning emphasis on archaeology corresponds with the public’s disapproval of
his regime and the growing divides within the power structure and Iraq as a whole. Sa'adoon Al Zubayadi (Saddam’s personal translator and Iraqi ambassador to the US between 1995 and 2001)
noted that his withdrawal from the public sphere coincided with the general public’s drop in
enthusiasm for Saddam’s regime and that although many factors led to the collapse of the
regime, the erosion of cultural unity centered around the idea of a Babylonian identity was
significant (Cremonesi 2003). The 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent destabilization of the
regime was the final nail in the coffin for nationalist Iraqi archaeology.
2003 Invasion and Transition Government
The chaos of war that accompanied the 2003 invasion put an end to much of the
institutional oversight of Iraqi archaeology and funding for research in Iraq (Gibson 2003); it
also destabilized the public university system the Ba’athists had established. This eliminated
public engagement with archaeological resources, protections, and accessibility to the artifacts.
The elimination of public involvement, the reality of war, and the desperation that soon gripped
Iraq opened the door to mass looting.
The value the general public placed on accessibility to archaeological resources can be
seen even after the elimination of the Ba’athist party, however. In post-invasion Iraq one of the
more common complaints or grievances reported by older Iraqis (those who would have attended
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school after Saddam’s education reform began) was the loss of culture and history. Although the
coalition invasion did not destroy the history of Iraq and did make efforts to protect it, the
destruction of the Ba’athist nationalist education programs and the rise in mass looting meant
that for a time the only way archaeological resources were accessible to the younger generations
was via written sources, especially as it was far too dangerous to visit sites in person. The
artifacts, reconstructions, and museums that had once created the link between the people, the
past, and the Ba’athist party were all gone.
Mass unemployment, the disbanding of the government and military and the elimination
of the education infrastructure all contributed to the loss of protections for archaeological sites
and museums (Silberman 1989). Under the Ba’athists, extremely harsh punishments had
dissuaded potential looters across Iraq, looting being regarded as stealing directly from the
nation. Now with a disbanded army, the potential for punishment was greatly reduced and many
unemployed soldiers found quick and easy money looting the sites they were supposed to guard
(CI #3). Local corruption created more chaos as museums that housed archaeological collections
were unable to confirm what they did and did not have and, in some cases, museums simply did
not report what they had as they were fearful of being looted. Some museum staff attempted to
protect the Iraqi National Museum’s collections by either wrapping exhibits in foam or
barricading section of the museum (Figures 4.4 and 4.5). Museum staff also were found to have
conveniently “lost” items that later re-appeared for sale. In some cases, museum workers just as
conveniently “recovered” lost items when questioned by US Marines (Bogdanos 2005:497). The
value of Mesopotamian artifacts increased substantially as a result of the chaos of the war,
becoming a sellers’ market and making looting more attractive (Figure 4.6).
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Figure 4.4. (Left). Iraqi National Museum staff attempted to barricade this doorway, but looters
with heavy equipment breached the room and looted the contents (Gibson 2003: Fig. 2).
Figure 4.5. (Right) The destroyed archives of the National Museum. Countless documents and
site reports were lost during the 2003 conflict (Gibson 2003: Fig. 3).

Figure 4.6. Mean price per lot offered (£) for Mesopotamian artifacts between 1981 and 2008 at
Christie’s, London (Brodie 2011: Fig. 7.4).
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To add to the disconnect between the public and archaeological resources, many
archaeological sites fell into ruin due to lack of maintenance or were destroyed by overly zealous
weapons fire during the initial invasion (Gibson 2003) (Figure 4.7). For instance, just outside of
the town of Najaf, the restored ruins of several Babylonian structures were destroyed in an
attempt to make room for landing helicopters until community members and professors from the
local university pleaded with US troops to stop.

Figure 4.7. M1 Abrams tank in front of the Children’s section of the Iraqi National Museum. The
hole above the arch was caused by a US tank round during fighting between US and Iraqi forces
(Gibson 2003: Fig. 1).
Najaf was one of the few places to retain some control of archaeological sites. During
interviews conducted with Iraqi residents in 2014, numerous older community members stated
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that archaeological sites needed protection as they were part of the national legacy. This is an
indicator of the successful indoctrination of this generation by the Baathist regime, and how
important the sites were to this demographic. Conversely, those residents who were born after
the Persian Gulf War and the subsequent struggles of the early 2000s, when archaeology was no
longer emphasized in the curriculum, felt little connection to the sites and saw them as simply
“old houses”.
Another crisis created by the disbanding of the Iraqi military and the fall of the Ba’athist
regime was a substantial growth in violent looters. After the nation’s museums were looted by
disbanded troops, countless artifacts made their way onto the black market (Poole 2008). Partly
this was because these fledging insurgencies needed funds to purchase weapons, material, and
loyalty. After 2003, and especially after the 2013 Iraqi Civil War, the illicit artifact trade in Iraq
went from a fledgling cottage industry to a militarized operation. Although most looting
operations were conducted by small teams with hand tools, larger and larger operations that were
far from institutional control began to use heavy machinery (CI #3). In addition, it was not
uncommon for looters to bring gunmen with them for the sole purpose of killing witnesses (CI
#3). Archaeological sites were left un-managed and looters dug pits and toppled standing
structures in an attempt to find things to sell. Some of this looting was conducted by former
antiquities officials, Ba’athist government members who knew the value of the sites, but much of
it was carried out by desperate individuals who fall into the category of subsistence looters. The
term subsistence looting or subsistence digging defines individuals who excavate archaeological
sites and sell artifacts due to poverty (Hollowell 2006; Matsuda 2005). It is important to consider
how conflict thrusts people into poverty because it displaces people, destroys resources, and
disrupts social order. Looted artifacts found their way to dealers in Turkey, Hong Kong, and

74

Switzerland. Under the hastily formed transitional government in 2004, Grand Ayatollah Ali alSistani was instrumental in stopping some large-scale looting operations and worked with Italian
and US troops to establish patrols near archaeological sites (Lawler 2008) (Figure 4.8). These
patrols were initially effective in preventing looting, but distinguishing between professional
looters, insurgents, or just down on their luck subsistence diggers proved difficult (Figure 4.9).
The level of looting in transition Iraq could be an indication that the sites were simply not as
valued by the youth who grew up without the Ba’athist regime’s indoctrination, that the
desperation of war and recovery pushed more people into engaging in looting activities, or most
likely a combination of both.

Figure 4.8. Helicopter gunner scans site for potential looters and looks for evidence of newly dug
pits at Ur. Note the weapon is a 5.56mm FN Minimi, a Squad automatic weapon with less
penetration than larger 7.62mm and .50 cal door guns typically equipped on combat helicopters.
This weapon is well-suited for use around archaeological resources. (Undated)(Cristiano Laruffa
https://iwa.univie.ac.at/iraqarchive19.html).
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Figure 4.9. Looters captured by Italian forces at Tell el-Lahm in 2004. Determining their motives
and allegiance is often difficult (Cristiano Laruffa https://iwa.univie.ac.at/iraqarchive19.html).
ISIS/ISIL and Archaeology
After US and coalition troops withdrew from Iraq and the Iraqi government went through
several phases of restructuring, a power vacuum opened up, leading to the rise of ISIS/ISIL. The
organization itself was an unrecognized proto-state founded on extremist Sunni teachings and
Salafi Jihadism. Under Salafi Jihadism, adherents attempt to return Sunni Islam to its roots. This
is why ISIS/ISIL considers pre-Islamic cultures to be blasphemous and archaeological resources
associated with them fit only to be destroyed or sold to benefit the state (Dirven 2015).
The ISIS/ISIL attitude toward Iraq’s antiquities is interesting as they on the one hand saw
them as blasphemous and only worthy of destruction while on the other hand, they recognized
their financial value. As most ISIS/ISIL solders were born after the Persian Gulf War and were
often transplants from other countries, they usually had not received the indoctrination
implemented by the Ba’athist regime. This further separated them from a connection to the
archaeological resources their ideology told them to destroy. Furthermore, the massive
destruction of sites could in part be attributed to an extreme rejection of the Baathist emphasis on
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history and archaeology. Many of the ISIS/ISIL fighters would have grown up during the later
years of the Ba’athist regime or during the Iraq war, and as such felt angered and distrustful of
anything the prior regime valued due to its association with previous trauma.
ISIS/ISIL also was engaged in a war with the West on ideological grounds. Destroying
archaeological resources was a strategic move to anger and insult western nations who had put so
much value on these resources since the colonial period (Arnold 2018). It also gained extensive
media attention for ISIS/ISIL abroad, allowing them to spread their influence outside the Middle
East and in a sense bring the war to the doorstep of militarily powerful western nations with a
minimal expenditure of resources (Figure 4.10). This tactic has been used by other groups
attempting to gain attention and strike at the West through academia, most notably the Taliban’s
destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan in 1998 and 2001 (Rathje 2001). Destroying
an ancient temple after all is much cheaper than bombing civilians, shooting up public places, or
crashing aircraft into buildings (Figure 4.11). In fact, with the images of looting and destruction
of these sites finding their way onto CNN, FOX, BBC, Al Jazeera, and many more large-scale
news outlets along with social media, ISIS was able to spread its message faster than anyone
could have imagined. The message being sent to the western academic establishment was clearly
that ISIS/ISIL can rip out and destroy what western academics value most and there is little that
can be done to stop them. This move alone gave ISIS/ISIL more ideological power than even
Saddam had wielded with his politicization of Iraq’s archaeological resources.
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Figure 4.10. The remains of the University of Mosul, destroyed by retreating Islamic State
militants during the battle for Mosul. (Reuters/Marko Djurica).

Figure 4.11. Barrel bombs primed by ISIS/ISIL militants at Nimrud’s Northwest Palace.
(Video released by ISIS on April 11, 2015).
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People and Archelogy in Iraq
Several trends emerge when attitudes toward Iraq’s archaeological resources and their
treatment by its people before, during, and after regime changes are considered. The Ba’athist’s
use of archaeology to indoctrinate the public by making archaeological resources and
archaeologically based education more accessible served a stabilizing role in the Iraqi
community and created a system of reverence and respect for archaeological research and the
ancient cultures of the region. This reverence aged with the community and faded under the
problems the late Ba’athist regime had either created for itself or had inflicted upon it. The
transition government put archaeology on the backburner, as it had more pressing issues to deal
with, along with general disinterest on the part of the public, leading to additional neglect and
eventually a sense that these resources were there to be exploited if they could no longer be
protected and had ceased to be meaningful as symbols of national unity. Combined with the
reality and scarcity accompanying a state of constant warfare, these changing attitudes led to
archaeological resources being less revered and viewed increasingly as commodities. The
ISIS/ISIL rejection of the Baathist politicization of archaeology represented the final stage in the
separation of Iraq’s people from the archaeological resources within its borders. ISIS/ISIL
effectively weaponized archaeological resources against the prior regimes and the greater
geopolitical community. Over the course of Iraq’s modern history, archaeological resources have
shifted from being a source of community building and focus of academic interest to a weapon
used to self-destructive effect in a larger global conflict.
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Chapter 5: Implications for Military, Transitional Governments, and Intelligence
Communities
Military involvement with archaeological resources during invasion and occupation
As the 2003 invasion of Iraq clearly demonstrated, military forces will inevitably come
into contact with archaeological resources in conflict zones. This contact typically results when
active conflict occurs in close proximity to archaeological sites, making it necessary to secure
buildings like museums and universities or artifacts being found or sold within and outside the
country. Military units operating in such areas should consider the potential use of both
education and physical force in devising strategies to protect archaeological resources.
Education
Education of military personnel is essential, particularly for those in the combat branches
of the armed services, as they are the most likely to come into contact with archaeological
resources. In the early stages of the war in Afghanistan and later Iraq, there was a degree of
pushback (Pollock 2003, 2004, 2008) from the anthropological community concerning the ethics
of providing guidance to the armed forces. Most notable was a statement published by the
American Anthropological Association in which interactions with US military forces, including
the Human Terrain Mapping Project, were described as a violation of its code of ethics
(Emberling 2008). Another issue was the discomfort felt by many archaeologists about speaking
to the media for fear that their words might be twisted by external interests to justify an agenda
(Pollock 2003). The media as an institution represent one of the most effective tools for
archaeologists to disseminate information to non-archaeologists, and as such could help to
mitigate archaeological losses; however, this tool can also be used as a weapon, leading to the
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reluctance of some archaeologists to engage in media interactions. In 2003 this type of
information dissemination was easily weaponized by western news outlets to justify military
actions taken within the country or to blame others (such as Iraqis themselves) for the destruction
of sites (Pollock 2004). This type of media manipulation shifted the public’s attention from the
destruction caused by coalition troops and blamed local communities instead. Naturally this is
ethically problematic and pushed many archaeologists away from engaging with the media and
government entities that could have benefitted from professional archaeological expertise in
protecting archaeological and other forms of cultural heritage in Iraq (Pollock 2003, 2004).
There are of course many ethical considerations to take into account during any form of military
operation, and as a former soldier and an archaeologist I can attest to the complexity of the issue.
However, by standing on the sidelines or claiming scientific exceptionalism, individuals or
organizations are simply allowing harm to come to archeological resources through inaction.
There is no one-size-fits-all doctrine or approach for dealing with this complex issue and
unfortunately, the reality of a situation like Iraq is that once a war is in progress people will
suffer from it. It is the ethical responsibility of anthropologists to mitigate this suffering, even if
that requires engaging with groups that they are uncomfortable with (Emberling 2008).
Anthropologists can interact with the armed forces in constructive ways, such as providing
informational guidance on peoples, locations, and cultures, as well as providing education to
forces that will directly engage with these populations (Emberling 2008). During the Iraq War
the US military’s “CENCOM Historical/Cultural Advisory Group” provided a fairly
comprehensive education for US troops on Iraq’s archaeological resources and cultural sites
(CENTCOM 2006). The advisory group used qualitative research presented in an understandable
way to train those not inducted into the mysteries of archaeology by focusing on the history of
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Iraq and the different types of archaeological resources found within the country. However, this
training could be improved by explaining to troops how nationalism and political regimes
interact with archaeological resources. This would provide troops with a better understanding of
how the local populations might view these resources and could allow for smoother interactions
between US forces and local communities. This would in turn strengthen relationships between
civilians and US military personnel, creating a more secure operational environment.
Physical Force
Limitations on physical force to protect archaeological sites should be considered by
military forces operating in areas with cultural resources under certain circumstances, such as in
proximity to ruins, historic buildings, or even known yet unexcavated archaeological sites. In the
past establishing no strike zones around sites has helped to prevent massive damage, such as
limiting Israeli troops’ use of heavy equipment in and around Jerusalem during the 6-Day War in
1967 (Oren 2002) and limiting the US Air Forces use of ordinance during the First Gulf War
(Cordesman 1994). No strike zones do limit a military’s ability to project force, but in the long
run are likely to preserve the sites and keep public opinion positive. Typically, no strike zones
apply to the use of aircraft ordinance but I would argue that no strike zones should be established
that also apply to smaller arms. In 2004 the Italian Carabinieri restricted their forces to the use of
lower penetrating weapons such as those chambered for 5.56mm ammunition near sites in Iraq
(Deblauwe 2004) and a similar approach should be adopted by any force operating near an
identified archaeological resource. As a soldier myself, I understand that there is a difference
between want and need. The reality is that in some cases larger scale weapons with more
penetrating power are necessary. This is where educating ground forces plays such a key role. It
would be unreasonable to restrict an infantry officer to only using smaller calibers like 5.56mm
82

when their soldiers/marine’s lives are at stake, but educating them on the potentially irreparable
damage larger weapons will cause to archaeological resources could lead some officers to
consider other approaches before resorting to high penetration armaments. This would help to
protect both the artifacts and the local communities. Education and training along these lines
could be conducted in the pre-deployment phase, as it is already done in some cases, but should
be continually reenforced during deployment.
Governments, Transition Governments and Communities
After a regime is toppled or a transition of power occurs, it is important to maintain
protections of archaeological resources. Regardless of whether an occupying force has control of
a nation or a transitional government does, the dual factors of collaboration and conservation
need to be considered.
Collaboration
A transitional government or occupying force should seek to collaborate with the nation’s
academic community and with its primary education community (grades K-12 or equivalent as
well as university educators). The nation’s academic community will know its own cultural
resources better than any foreign academic community. During the Iraq War the international
academic community was consulted by the US and the transitional government, but the local
academic community was mostly excluded from providing insights into Iraq’s archaeological
resources due to its connections to the prior regime. The primary school teachers were
completely ignored by both the transitional government and the coalition occupation forces.
These teachers should be consulted because not only do they know the community better than
anyone, but they also are raising the next generation, a generation any transitional government or
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occupying force would want to be on good terms with. Both the academic community and
primary school community can also help identify local archaeological resources that may not be
recognized on an international scale. These resources often don’t receive the benefit of no strike
orders or protections form security forces. How these institutions initially interact and continue
to interact with archaeological resources is key to winning the general populace over in nations
with a tradition of strongly politized archaeology.
Conservation Forces
Funding and training a dedicated conservation force are also important actions to take in
safeguarding local cultural patrimony in conflict zones. Although the use of Italian and US
troops has proven effective in Iraq, a force that has stable funding and is staffed by local
populations should be the goal of a transitional government or occupying force dedicated to
protecting archaeological resources. The establishment of such a force ties into community
building around archaeological sites and museums. Creating community and encouraging buy-in
by all stakeholders will deter looters and deter radicalization, criminal enterprise, and
insurgency, all factors that thrive in weakened communities. If the population is allowed to have
a hand in the protection of these resources this will strengthen the local community and create a
more secure environment that transcends the archaeological sphere. Providing alternative
employment has effectively reduced instances of subsistence looting across the world at
locations such as Tell Yoqne’am (Hemo and Linn 2017), Fayum (Wendrich 2006), and Bo Sauk
(Charoenwongsa 2006). The important role played by community engagement in the protection
of resources is not limited to archaeology; conservation scientists have found that community
involvement and development have proven effective at reducing poaching in Thailand
(Steinmetz et al 2014) and Namibia (Anderson and Jooste 2014).
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Archaeological Resources and the Intelligence Community
Archaeological resources and how they interact with national and ethnic goals can be
very valuable sources of intelligence and should not be overlooked as merely interesting
supplemental knowledge. Along with all the factors examined earlier in this chapter,
understanding how a nation’s people interact with archaeological resources can provide
intelligence on how the people interact with their own government. In the case of Iraq, the
people, the regime, and the archaeology are all interlinked and to understand one, you need to
understand the others. These interconnections can be used to gather information on the attitudes
of a regime, the displacement of regime resources, or the attitudes of the people, warranting more
investigation and a greater investment up front by all parties concerned. This knowledge in turn
can be effectively used to better understand how to interact with a group under observation and
how to effectively influence said group on the world stage. During the First World War,
Gertrude Bell used cultural and political knowledge she had gained while conducting
archaeological work in the Middle East to train British officers to operate in the region along
with guiding them on the nuances of tribal Arab politics, which were instrumental in organizing
an Arab led guerrilla campaign (Bell 1920; Wallach 1996). Simultaneously behind enemy lines,
T.E. Lawrence used his historical and cultural knowledge of the diverse Arab tribes to organize a
large-scale guerrilla campaign that played a significant role in turning the Middle Eastern theater
in favor of the British and destabilized the Ottoman Empire, which in turn allowed for the
redeployment of military resources to Europe as these forces were no longer needed in the
Middle East (Lawrence 1926; Murphey 2011). Bell’s and Lawrence’s understanding of the
complex origins of the region was directly related to their ability to apply the interconnections
between history, culture, and people to contemporary geopolitical policies, changing the course

85

of a World War. The study of archaeological resources and how they connect to governments
and people is an effective tool for intelligence gathering that has been and continues to be
applicable to research and studies of other geopolitical entities beyond the Middle East.
Conclusions
This thesis posed the question “How has Iraq, a nation that has historically promoted
archaeology as a national resource, handled archaeological sites and artifacts in the aftermath of
military conflict and civil unrest that destabilized the Ba’athist regime?” The following
considerations were outlined at the beginning of the thesis:
1. How were archaeological resources treated by incoming governments compared to previous
regimes? Were they viewed as valuable resources, burdens, or simply ignored?
Although the Ba’athist regime seems to have viewed the archaeological record largely as
a national resource, it is clear that the transitional government put archaeology on the
backburner, as it had more pressing issues to deal with, along with increasing disinterest on the
part of the public in a self-reinforcing spiral of economic decline. The constant stress and
scarcity brought on by war led to archaeological resources being less revered and viewed more
as commodities. The nation’s archaeological resources were not forgotten, but a concerted effort
was not made by the government to preserve them. Instead, protection of archaeological
resources in Iraq fell into the hands of foreign powers and local governments. With the rise of
ISIS/ISIL, the more mature post-2003 government of Iraq was unable to protect these resources
as there wasn’t enough institutional stability after the destruction of the Ba’athist Regime.
2. What relationship do these resources have to the nation’s cultural identity?
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Iraq’s archaeological resources have a strong connection to Iraqi national identity.
Although institutional protection of archaeological resources and emphasis on their value
decreased between the Ba’athist regime and the transitional government, it is clear that at least
some segments of the population continue to identify with both Iraq’s archaeology and ancient
history. With the rise of ISIS/ISIL these resources were rejected as part of the national identity
by extremists, but the general population still considered them part of their national heritage, as
evidenced by the rebirth and rebranding of the Ba’athist era Babylon Festival (Al-Thawra 2019;
CI #3) and the concerted efforts of Iraqi civilians and government to preserve what remains after
20 years of conflict (Al-Thawra 2020; CI #3, CI #2).
3. How are/were archaeological remains treated by private citizens pre- and post- regime
change? Are/were they respected, looted, or used as an economic draw?
This question is very difficult to answer, as there are many possible interpretations of the
available information and data. Private citizens treat these resources based on the nature of the
conditions prevailing at the time. That is, when not in desperate situations driven by hunger,
unemployment, and war, the citizens revere these resources, but when faced with dire economic
circumstances the same resources may be harvested for survival. Although the archaeological
patrimony of the region was an economic tourist draw historically, war and unrest have made
this industry unproductive, leading to the more destructive looting industry. This type of activity
can be seen outside Iraq and is especially prevalent in Egypt. After the revolution of JanuaryFebruary 2011, large-scale looting of both archaeological sites and museums coupled with
corruption, mass unemployment and shifting institutional control created significant problems
for Egyptian archaeology. These factors combined with the rise of extremist militants and civil
unrest have led to a fall in tourism which largely supported Egypt’s pre-revolution
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archaeological resources, a process seen in many post-conflict societies including Iraq and
southern Mexico, where the rising power of the cartels has followed a similar trajectory (Woody
2018). Egypt’s interim government’s mass release of the Mubarak regime’s political prisoners
also added to the nation’s unrest, allowing both passive and extremist elements to gain power
(Hessler 2019; Tovrov 2012). The prevalence of looting there is illustrated by aerial images of
the looter’s pits at the sites of Lisht and Saqqara, which increased 520% over the course of one
season (Parcak 2015). While Iraq may not have as much analyzed or declassified satellite data
available for study, analysis of the auction markets illustrates the similarities between the two
case studies. Just as in Iraq, looting in Egypt can be interpreted as the result of a combination of
economic instability, geographic distance from centralized control and the instability of
institutional control (Ikram 2013). Overall, across regions it can be said that some of those who
loot these sites may be reluctant looters, or those who only do it out of necessity, while others
simply see opportunity in an otherwise bleak economy, especially with the rise of extremist
organizations like ISIS/ISIL.
4. What conclusions can we draw from contemporary conflicts to develop a toolkit/protocol for
dealing with and protecting archaeological resources in future conflict zones?
As discussed at the beginning of the chapter, the answer to this is a tripod, each leg of
which must be stable for the whole to stand. Military forces must be educated on the nation’s
archaeological resources and must have weapons type and use regulated in proximity to
resources. Transitional governments need to collaborate with the international and most
importantly local education community. They must also establish conservation forces or request
forces from allied governments if resources are not available to establish homegrown
organizations. The intelligence community’s role is to understand the population affected by
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these conflicts in relation to their archaeological resources and be able to advise and direct the
before-mentioned factors before, during, and after conflict.
Although the list of ways political entities can negatively influence archaeological
research is quite long, the relationship between the two is both good and bad. Political entities
can abuse archaeology but, in some cases, can also use archaeology to benefit their people. The
Ba’athists used archaeology to indoctrinate and distract the public from atrocities carried out by
members of the regime but they also created a system of public museums, monuments, and parks
that became a strong force in the Iraqi state and created a system of reverence and respect for
archaeological research. Similar responses to conflict and regime change have been reported for
Egypt (Meskell 2020), Thailand (Shoocongdej 2011), China (Friedman 1994), Japan (Pearson
1992), Israel (Feige 2015), Peru (Burger 1989), Taiwan (Zorzin 2018), and South Korea (Kim
2013), which have all successfully used government institutions as an apparatus to build a strong
public connection to the ancient past. However, these strong connections to the past can be
weaponized when a system implodes, as in the case of the ISIS/ISIL rejection of Ba’athist
politicization of archaeology and destruction of archaeological resources to assert power.
Ultimately, anytime political interests are combined with cultural resources outside the political
sphere, there is the potential to create a maelstrom that destroys more than it creates.
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